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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (1996) and Rule 42 of the Utah Rides of Appellate Procedure. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee is Plaintiff William Anthony Kraatz, referred to as 
"Kraatz." Appellee and Cross-Appellant is Heritage Imports, dba Heritage Honda 
("Heritage"). All claims against Defendants O. Bryan Wilkinson ("B. Wilkinson") and 
Jeffrey J. Wilkinson (MJJ. Wilkinson") were dismissed, and no appeal was taken from 
their dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Heritage has reviewed the issues raised by Kraatz, which can be summarized in 
the order Kraatz presented as follows: 
Issue No. 1. Whether Judge Frederick was clearly erroneous and without 
evidentiary support in finding Kraatz is entitled to Stock Appreciation Rights of 
$90,000 based upon the credible testimony of Larry H. Miller that the purchase price 
of Heritage was between $3,000,000 and $3,100,000. 
Standard of Review: uTo successfully attack findings of fact, a party must 
first marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even when viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, the 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence is insufficient to support the findings." R.L. Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 
666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). aIt is the trial court's role to assess witness 
credibility, given its advantaged position to observe testimony first hand, and normally, 
we will not second guess the trial court's findings in this regard." Promax Dev'mt 
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1997). As Kraatz noted, u[t]he appellate court will presume a trial court's award 
of damages to be correct and will overturn it only if it is clearly erroneous and without 
reasonable support in the evidence" Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230, 
1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Issue No. 2. Whether Judge Frederick was clearly erroneous in refusing to 
award extracontractual damages to Kraatz. 
Standard of Review: "[BJecause the adequacy of a damage award is a 
factual question, we will not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App 31, f 6, 973 P.2d 445, 447, ajfd 1 
P.3d 783 (Utah 2000). Further, "the trial court is vested with broad discretion and the 
award will not be set aside unless it is manifestiy unjust or indicates that the trial court 
neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous 
circumstances." O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Thus, 
we must affirm the award of damages if evidence in the record supports the award." 
Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 115 (Utah 1984). Further, 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
whether the parties have modified or amended a previously existing contract is also a 
question of fact. See Colonial Pac. Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C.J.R. Corp., 1999 UT App 
91, f27 , 977 P.2d 541, 548. 
Issue No. 3. Whether Judge Frederick was clearly erroneous in refusing to 
award a greater yearly bonus to Kraatz by rejecting the changes Kraatz's urged to 
accounting records regularly kept by Heritage. 
Standard of Review: *[B]ecause the adequacy of a damage award is a 
factual question, we will not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App 31, 1 6, 973 P.2d 445, 447), aff*d 7 
P.3d 783 (Utah 2000). Further, "the trial court is vested with broad discretion and the 
award will not be set aside unless it is manifesdy unjust or indicates that the trial court 
neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous 
circumstances." O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Thus, 
we must affirm the award of damages if evidence in the record supports the award." 
Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 115 (Utah 1984). 
Issue No. 4. Whether Judge Frederick erred by refusing to award Kraatz fees 
for experts who did not testify, costs for a dozen non-essential depositions and other 
unreasonable costs. 
Standard of Review: Heritage agrees with Kraatz that the trial court's 
interpretation of the meaning of costs is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT. Ct. App. 404, J10, 38 P.3d 1001, 1003. 
Issue No. 5. Whether Judge Frederick erred by refusing to award prejudgment 
interest on Kraatz's unliquidated attorney fees, costs, and uncertain damages. 
Standard of Review: As Kraatz mentioned, the trial court's decision 
regarding entidement to prejudgment interest is a question of law, which is reviewed 
for correctness. See Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). 
Issue No. 6. Whether Judge Frederick erred in refusing to award Kraatz 
damages based upon an increase in the Consumer Price Index. 
Standard of Review: Heritage agrees with the correctness standard set 
forth by Kraatz, affording the trial court no deference. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. 
ofTransp., 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993). 
CROSS-APPEAL 
Heritage has filed a Cross-Appeal. The sole issue is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in awarding $432,941.36 in attorney fees to Kraatz where Kraatz 
only succeeded in proving one of seven causes of action against only one of three 
named defendants, and where he only recovered a judgment in the principal amount of 
$124,118.56, after seeking $3,507,980.00 in damages in his complaint. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for trial court's award of 
attorney fees is clear abuse of discretion. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 
316 (Utah 1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to apportion attorney 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fees between successful and unsuccessful claims. See Paul Mueller Company v. Cache 
Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982). A court also abuses its 
discretion when it awards attorney fees that are excessive and not supported by the 
evidence. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). 
Citations to the Record where this issue was preserved in the trial court (R. 
4635-4641; 5059, p. 19-20). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Kraatz filed a complaint against Heritage on or about January 21, 1993, alleging 
causes of action for (1) breach of contract against Heritage, (2) breach of the duty of 
good faith & fair dealing against Heritage, (3) alter ego against B. Wilkinson, (4) 
inducement of breach against B. Wilkinson, (5) interference with prospective business 
relationship against B. Wilkinson, (6) inducement of breach against J. J. Wilkinson, and 
(7) inference with prospective business relationship against JJ . Wilkinson. (R. 1-19; 
4978-79). A four-day bench trail commenced before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick on August 27, 1996. The trial court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on or about October 28th, 1996, for no cause of action against 
Kraatz. Kraatz appealed that decision to this Court, which reversed and remanded for 
"a determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract, including reasonable attorney 
fees." See Memorandum Decision, p. 4 (1999 UT App 070). ("Memo Decision"). 
The trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Liability 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and Damages were entered April 30, 2001, and the Judgment was entered June 29, 
2001, awarding Kraatz $621,717.17 as follows: 
Principal $124,118.56 
Expert Witness Fees 35,502.09 
Costs 29,155.16 
Attorney Fees 432.941.36 
TOTAL $621,717.17 
Heritage's Cross-Appeal is from the award of attorney fees to Kraatz in the amount of 
$432,941.36. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
1. Kraatz and Heritage entered into a written Employment Agreement 
(the "Contract") on or about May 1990. (Ex. 38; R. 4061-72). 
2. Kraatz filed a Complaint on or about January 21, 1993 (R. 1-19). 
A four-day bench trial began August 30, 1996. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were entered on October 28, 1996, for no cause of action against Kraatz. (R. 
1681-1717). 
3. Kraatz appealed to this Court, which reversed and remanded "for a 
determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract, including reasonable attorney 
fees." (Memo Decision, p. 4). 
4. Counsel for Kraatz submitted an attorney fees affidavit September 
25, 2000, at the time he filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
6 
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asking for attorney fees of $380,180.00. (R. 4335-36). 
5. Kraatz's counsel filed a supplemental request for attorney fees and 
accompanying affidavits on or about March 19, 2001, requesting additional attorney 
fees of $65,288.40 (R. 4775-4811). 
H. KRAATZ INCOMPLETELY OR INCORRECTLY SET FORTH THE 
FOLLOWING CLAIMED FACTS1: 
A. Lost Wages & Benefits. Kraatz claimed Heritage did not challenge the 
calculations of his accountant, Bruce Wisan. At trial, Heritage challenged not only the 
conclusions and limit also the calculations of both Wisan and Schmitz, an expert called 
by Kraatz, through extensive cross-examination (e.g., 2125, 2140, 2144-2146, 2273, 
2288, 2295, 2338, 2458, & 2441), through various exhibits, and through the testimony 
of Heritage's two accountants. (R.2177-2180, 2400-2404 & Ex. 333). 
1. Profit sharing. Wisan claimed "adjustments" should be made in 
the accounting records regularly kept by Heritage for "two unreasonable expenses," 
i.e., the purchase price and the rent paid to Miller.2 However, Heritage's accounting 
records were audited and accepted by the IRS. (R. 2179-80). Further, the Contract 
stated that any yearly bonus due Kraatz was to be based on the "accounting practices 
acceptable to and used by Company in reporting to American Honda, Incorporated." 
1
 Heritage responds by designations and numbers corresponding to Kraatz's brief, pp. 
8-24. 
2
 Interestingly, Kraatz claims the benefit of Larry H. Miller's purchase of Heritage, 
but seeks to "adjust" any burdens. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 4067). There is no evidence American Honda, Inc., objected to Heritage's 
accounting practices. Also, the trial court found Kraatz had access to Heritage 
accounting records prior to his employment with Heritage. (R. 1855, 2468 & 4996). 
Kraatz never objected to the accounting practices while employed at Heritage. (R. 
4996). 
2 & 3. Sports Mall and Country Club. The Contract provided Kraatz 
Sports Mall and Country Club memberships for "business use." (R. 4067; Ex. 38, Sch. 
"A," 1(d) & (e)). Kraatz admitted at trial he never used the Sports Mall for business 
purposes. (R. 1859-60). He also admitted in the twenty-seven months he was the 
General Manager, he did not use the Hidden Valley membership for business use. (R. 
1859). This Court's Memo Decision did not overturn or modify these Findings. 
Accordingly, there is no basis to support recovery.3 
4. St. George Home Reimbursement. Kraatz claims he was denied 
payment for St. George home reimbursements. However, Kraatz admitted at trial B. 
Wilkinson never promised to indefinitely pay the differential between the rental of St. 
3
 The only basis for Kraatz's claims come outside the Contract. For instance, although 
he had not played golf, he expressed to his accountant his future intent to play three 
rounds of golf with a guest and cart each summer. (R. 2131). This statement is purely 
speculative and cannot support any award of damages. See Sawyers v. FMA Leasing 
Co., 722 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986) (holding damage award must be founded on 
rational basis and cannot be based upon speculation.). It is also hearsay, not of the type 
reasonably relied upon by experts. See Utah R. Evid. R. 703; State v. Clayton, 646 
P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1982). 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Goerge home and the mortgage on his Salt Lake home. (R. 1859). 
5-8. Additional Compensation Kraatz re-asserts claims for annual 
Christmas bonus, Jazz tickets, retirement contributions, and warranty income. Kraatz 
fails to recognize this Court remanded for damages and attorney fees "under the 
contract" - not extracontractual damages. Kraatz admitted the following at trial: (1) 
that Christmas bonuses were not included in his Contract (R. 1865); (2) the Jazz tickets 
were not included in his written Contract and B. Wilkinson determined who got Jazz 
tickets (R. 2142-45); (3) retirement contributions were not in his Contract (R. 1865); 
and (4) he did not provide any additional consideration for warranty income. (R. 1857-
58). 
9. Unreimbursed Health Care Costs. Kraatz fails to mention in his 
brief that because Heritage was never profitable under his direction, he agreed to 
forego non-covered health reimbursements. (R. 1837-38). Kraatz asserts he only 
agreed to postpone those payments. However, Heritage never became profitable under 
his tenure as General Manager. (Ex. 333). This Court's Memo Decision concluded 
extrinsic evidence urged by Heritage should not have been considered by the trial court. 
(P. 4). Similarly, extrinsic evidence should not now be considered in Kraatz's favor. 
10. Summary of Lost Wages and Benefits. There is no record cite to 
Kraatz's claims J.J. Wilkinson lacked experience, or to a comparison of his duties to 
Kraatz. The dealership was profitable under J.J. Wilkinson's tenure following Kraatz. 
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(Ex. 333). Kraatz also claims Miller would have retained him as General Manager 
and he would have received a 10% interest in the dealership. However, Miller actually 
testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. Now, with respect to - is there any doubt in your 
mind that Tony Kraatz could run Heritage Honda as a 
Larry Miller dealership just as well or better than J.J. 
Wilkinson? 
A. Yeah, anywhere in the time frame he was at Heritage 
Honda. In fact, he and I talked about it on occasion and I 
would not have had any qualms about doing it. Your 
question was, is there any doubt in my mind, and today, 
yes, there is some doubt because of this conflicting 
information. (R. 2090-91). 
Miller also testified the dealership had enough capital to allow the General Manager to 
run the dealership normally, and that Miller's Toyota dealership, which sells a similar 
product, had $23,000 less capital than Heritage during 1992 and the Toyota dealership 
still made a profit (R. 2220-21). 
B. Value of Heritage Stock. Kraatz asserts Miller testified he purchased 60% 
of the stock in the Heritage for between $3,000,000 and $3,100,000 (R. 2216), and 
therefore, the total value of the dealership was significantly higher. However, because 
of a minority discount and other factors, Miller testified he purchased the dealership for 
between 3 and 3.1 million dollars. (R. 2216-22). The trial court found Miller's 
testimony to be credible. (R. 5001 & 2466-67). 
10 
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C. Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses. 
2. Paragraphs 25, 36 and 37 from the Affidavit of Michael N. Zundel 
are replete with inadmissible argument and legal conclusions. See Capital Assets Fin. 
Services, 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding trial court must disregard 
an affidavit containing legal conclusions). That Heritage identified 30 potential 
witnesses does not warrant a deposition of all or most of those persons. 
3- Expert Witness Fees. The conclusory allegations in Zundel's 
Affidavit do not invalidate the trial court's decision in disallowing fees for two experts 
who were not deposed and did not testify at trial. (R. 5002-03). 
4. Pre-Judgment Interest. As addressed below, Kraatz is not entided 
to claim pre-judgment interest for extracontractual and unliquidated damages. 
5. Consumer Price Index. Kraatz may have correctly stated the 
increase in the consumer price index. However, before that becomes relevant, Kraatz 
must have been entided to such an increase. That issue is addressed under argument. 
DI. FACTS MARSHALED IN SUPPORT OF TRIAL COURT'S AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES4 
1. Kraatz purported to categorize attorney fee time and deduct 
4
 As stated in Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2001 UT App 226, j 41, 29 P.3d 668, 
676, cert, granted, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001), the party challenging the award of 
attorney fees must marshal all evidence introduced at trial that supports the trial court's 
award of attorney fees before ferreting out the fatal flaw in the evidence supporting that 
award. In the case at bar, there was no testimony taken regarding attorney fees. Only 
memoranda, affidavits and attorney timesheets were filed. 
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$12,937.00 spent on claims against individuals. (R. 4336, 4743-51, 4756-59 & 4970). 
Kraatz deducted other nonassessable attorney fees of $2,754.50 from the original 
amount sought. (R. 4970). 
2. Kraatz subsequently made the following additional deductions: 
$2,778.75 for profiling case assessment (R. 4970); $425.00 for time spent drafting the 
second cause of action (R. 4745 & 4970); $2,430.10 for 18% of pages of trial brief 
addressing tort claims (R. 4745 & 4971); $451 for 3 hours of time spent by K. 
Linebaugh and J. Dunn observing the trial (Id.); $757.71 for 1.29% of trial transcript 
representing 100% of Larry Don Terry's testimony (R. 4746 & 4971); $1,769.70 for 
3.01% of trial transcript representing 50% of J.J. Wilkinson's testimony (R. 4747 & 
4971); $2,882.09 for 4.9% of trial transcript representing 20% of B. Wilkinson's 
testimony (Id.); $3,651.79 deduction for 37.70% of their proposed Findings and 
Conclusions. (R. 4971). 
3. After oral argument on remand on March 31, 2001, Kraatz wrote 
the trial court and clarified he had reduced his request for attorney fees through trial to 
$225,210.36, which including $139,823.50 through appeal, prior to remand, totaled 
$365,033.86. (R. 4969-71). 
4. Kraatz was awarded additional post appeal attorney fees on remand 
of $67,907.50, without an evidentiary hearing (R. 5002). When combined with 
$365,033.86 for time spent through trial and appeal, brought the total attorney fees 
12 
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awarded to $432,941.36. Thus, the trial court awarded Kraatz all the attorney fees he 
requested. The award of attorney fees is based solely upon the motions and supporting 
memoranda, including attorney fee affidavits and timesheets. (R. 1220-1300 (redacted 
entries submitted to trial court), 4060-4606, 4729-4759, 4773-4810 & 5060-5125). 
5. The total voluntary fee reduction conceded by Kraatz was 
$30,837.64. (R. 4756 & 4970-71). This is a 6.65% reduction from Kraatz's original 
request for attorney fees. 
IV. FACTS SHOWING TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
WAS CLEARLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
1. Kraatz's complaint against Heritage, B. Wilkinson and J.J. 
Wilkinson alleged seven causes of action, i.e., breach of contract, breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, alter ego, inducement of breach (separately against each 
individual defendant), and interference with prospective business relationship 
(separately against each individual defendant). (R.l-19). 
2. Kraatz succeeded on only one of his seven causes of action against 
only one of three defendants. (R. 5005). 
3. Kraatz spent approximately 41.60 hours ($4,596.00) researching 
and conducting a statistical analysis of Judge Frederick reversal rate on appeal. (R. 
4458-62). 
4. Kraatz did not deduct time for extracontractual damage, for which 
he received no recovery. 
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5. Kraatz did not deduct time for claims he failed to prove. 
6. Kraatz did not deduct duplicative time spent by two or more 
attorneys. 
7. Kraatz did not deduct time for attorney travel. 
8. Kraatz did not deduct time for numerous attorney conferences. 
9. Kraatz did not deduct excessive attorney time. 
10. In 1993 after the complaint was filed, Heritage offered to pay 
Kraatz $308,000 to settle this matter, which offer was rejected by Kraatz's counsel. 
(R. 4682, included as tab 1 of Appendix). 
11. In August 1996, just prior to trial, Heritage again offered to settle 
this case by paying Kraatz $325,000, which offer was also rejected. (R. 4684, 
included as tab 2 of Appendix). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Kraatz appealed many of the trial court's Amended Findings concerning 
damages. In doing so, Kraatz relied on the wrong standard of review for several of his 
arguments. Kraatz admits his claim regarding stock valuation is subject to the twin 
tests of clearly erroneous, after first having marshaled all the evidence. In an attempt, 
however, to obtain a more favorable standard of review, Kraatz couches his arguments 
for extracontractual damages and yearly bonuses as questions of law. As noted under 
Statement of the Issues above, these issues are likewise subject to clearly erroneous and 
14 
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marshalling standards. His claims regarding expert fees and costs, prejudgment 
interest, and CPI adjustments are all simply arguments that the damages awarded were 
too low. 
Kraatz is entitled to damages for breach of his Contract. The award made by the 
trial court, however, is neither clearly erroneous or unsupported by the law. The trial 
court's valuation of Stock Appreciation Rights should be affirmed, as it was based upon 
the credible testimony of Larry H. Miller, who purchased the dealership. Further, the 
accounting methods used by Heritage to calculate yearly bonuses were accepted by 
American Honda, Inc., and passed an IRS audit, and Kraatz never objected to the 
accounting while he was employed with Heritage. Neither finding is clearly erroneous. 
Kraatz is also not entitled to extracontractual damages. This Court only 
remanded "for a determination of damages under the contract, including reasonable 
attorney fees." (Memo Decision, p.4). Further, Kraatz failed to preserve and raise 
most of his extracontractual claims in his first appeal. In either event, he is precluded 
from doing so now for the first time in his second appeal. 
The trial court's award of expert witness fees should not be disturbed on appeal 
because the experts in question did not testify at trial. Likewise, the trial court's award 
for deposition costs should not be altered since these depositions were non-essential and 
unnecessary in prosecuting this case. 
Finally, the trial court's decision denying prejudgment interest for damages that 
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were not liquidated or capable of calculation with mathematical certainty should not be 
disturbed. 
As to Heritage's Cross-Appeal, the trial court awarded Kraatz all the attorney 
fees requested, even though Kraatz achieved only partial success on one of seven causes 
of action against one of three defendants. The lower court awarded him attorney fees 
that were three and one-half times greater than the principal damages he received. In 
doing so, the lower court erred because the time entries by Kraatz's counsel are 
excessive and unreasonable and should be reduced to a reasonable amount 
commensurate with the limited recovery Kraatz was awarded after twice rejecting 
setdement offers for more than twice the principal sum recovered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS ON THE 
VALUE OF STOCK WERE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Kraatz claims the trial court's findings valuing Heritage's stock at $3,100,000 
were clearly erroneous. The Contract provided: 
Company and Employee hereby agree that the fair market value of 
Company's stock, as of the date of this Agreement, is Two Million 
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($2,500,000.00). Said Value is 
hereinafter referred to as the "Initial Value." (R. 4068). 
(Emphasis added). 
The Contract then provided upon termination without cause, Kraatz would be entitled to 
fifteen percent of any increase in the value of Heritage in excess of the $2,500,000 
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initial valuation. (R. 4068). On remand, the trial court awarded $90,000 to Kraatz for 
his Stock Appreciation Rights. 
Immediately after the Contract was signed, Kraatz took over as General 
Manager, and during that time, Heritage had the following losses: 
1990 loss of $295,515 
1991 profit of $5,169 
1992 loss of $124,980 (Ex. 333) (R. 4984). 
$415,326.00 TOTAL LOSS DURING KRAATZ TENURE. 
It is difficult to contemplate a dealership with an agreed upon fair market value of 
2,500,000,5 which proceeds to lose $415,326 from 1990 through 1992, could then be 
said to be valued at $4,200,000 when Kraatz was terminated. B. Wilkinson testified 
the dealership declined 50% in net worth during Kraatz's tenure. Kraatz states on p. 
35 of his Brief that the accounting records only reflect decline in net worth of 18.83%. 
(Kraatz Brief p.35). Whether the decline in value was 18.83% or 50%, it should be 
obvious Heritage did not increase in value almost $2,000,000, as claimed by Kraatz. 
5
 Kraatz claims the agreed upon value in the Contract is not the best evidence of value. 
In support of this notion, Kraatz cites Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), and asserts the time of approximately 27 months between when 
the Contract was entered and when Kraatz was terminated was too attenuated to be 
accurate. However, in Glezos, this Court cited "extraneous matters" that rendered the 
sale price less reliable than the appraiser's opinion in that case. Id. at 1235. Thus, 
Glezos is distinguishable from die valuation facts in this case. Kraatz is simply trying 
to re-write the Contract. 
17 
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The testimony at trial between Kraatz's expert, Mark Schmitz, and Larry Miller, 
who purchased the dealership, was conflicting. Schmitz admitted he based his 
valuation of more that $4,400,000 on a subjectively determined capitalization rate of 
17.5% (R. 2239), after making numerous adjustments to actual income.6 (R. 2238-40, 
2286 & 2300). He also based his valuation on an NAD A guide of "above-average" 
dealers, rather than actually evaluating the Heritage dealership (R. 2322). 
In contrast to the subjective, poorly supported testimony from Kraatz's expert, 
the court heard testimony from Larry Miller, who purchased a majority interest in the 
dealership shortly after Kraatz was terminated. Mr. Miller testified he had purchased 
30-35 dealerships at that time, and that he generally pays book value plus 
approximately $2,000,000 blue sky. (R. 2217-18). The book value of Heritage at the 
time he purchased was $1,100,000. (R. 2217-18). Thus, when you add $2,000,000 
for blue sky, it yields a value of $3,100,000. 
Kraatz attempts to use Mr. Miller's deposition testimony to suggest he valued 
the dealership at more than $3,000,000 - $3,100,000. However, Mr. Miller's trial 
testimony of $3,000,000 - $3,100,000 merely clarified his deposition testimony, which 
is entirely appropriate. See Transilift Equipment, LTD v. Cunningham, 360 S.E.2d 
6
 These adjustments include advertising expense, owner's compensation, rent and legal 
expense. (R. 2238). 
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183, 188 (Va. 1987) (holding "a litigant-witness has the right to explain or clarify his 
testimony, including previously entered deposition statements and interrogatory 
answers"); Klaus v. Goetz, 505 P.2d 726, 731 (Kan. 1973) ("Any witness may explain 
his deposition testimony which has been taken without the benefit of court supervision 
or intervention."). 
Mr. Miller purchased 60% of the stock in Heritage, leaving a minority of 
shareholders in the dealership. Although the minority owned 40% of the dealership, it 
was not a controlling interest, and not a significant factor when Miller valued the 
dealership. (R. 2201-02). Under the Stock Purchase Agreement (R. 4073-76), Mr. 
Miller only paid $360,000 for a 60% interest. The remainder of the total purchase 
price was allocated to items such as a Non-Compete Agreement (Ex. 88) and a 
Deferred Compensation Agreement. (Ex. 86), all of which were corporation obligations 
to be paid from 100% of the Stock. This formed the basis for Miller's opinion valuing 
the dealership at between $3,000,000 and $3,100,000, since the corporation paid for 
100% of all other obligations and since he personally purchased 60% of the stock for 
only $360,000. (R. 2216-17). This is also why Mr. Miller declared it's not "fair to 
cut, paste and glue this deal and try and come up with the biggest number." (R. 2209). 
As he stated repeatedly to Kraatz's counsel, "you're mixing apples and oranges." (R. 
2198, see also R. 2201 & 2209). Mr. Miller walked away from various prior deals, 
which can't be reconstituted. (R. 2209-10). 
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Mr. Miller was clear in testifying that Heritage was not worth $4.2 million in 
September of 1992. (R. 2200-02). His old discussions to purchase the remaining stock 
from B. Wilkinson's four children for $300,000 each was "keeping a commitment" to 
B. Wilkinson which the parties had been discussing for "11 or 12 years." (R. 2201). 
But if "you talk about the value of the stock, I still say it comes back to 3 million." (R. 
2202). Mr. Miller's personal relationship with B. Wilkinson is irrelevant to the issue 
of valuation. Further, the children's stock was never purchased for $300,000 or any 
other sum. 
Kraatz claims the dealership was attractive to Mr. Miller because it historically 
had expenses that were "out of whack" (R. 2084) that could be reduced. (Kraatz Brief, 
p. 33). ICraatz argues the accounting practices used by Heritage were improper and 
should be adjusted when valuing the dealership. However, the accounting methods 
utilized by Heritage were never challenged as unacceptable to American Honda, Inc., 
and furthermore, Heritage passed an IRS audit with only one minor correction of a 
mere $4,000. (R. 2179-80). Finally, Kraatz never objected to the accounting while he 
was employed with Heritage. (R. 4996). Given the foregoing, there is no basis to 
adjust the accounting records, to rewrite the Contract and to artificially inflate the value 
of the dealership to yield Kraatz larger damages. 
The trial court heard and considered the above evidence in finding the value of 
the dealership was consistent with Mr. Miller's testimony of a $3,100,000. (R. 2216-
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22). The court held: 
Given the hody disputed conflicts in the evidence, this Court is 
left, therefore, to assess the credibility of the witnesses' testimony. 
This has been done, and in this Court's view, the more credible, 
persuasive evidence is established by Larry H. Miller. (R. 5000 & 
2466-67). 
This Court must award deference to the trial court's finding of valuation based 
on credibility among conflicting testimony. See State in Interest of C.B., 1999 App. 
293, 989 P.2d 76,77 ("We review findings of fact for clear error, with deference given 
to the trial court."). There is more than sufficient evidence in the record to support and 
justify the trial court's decision, and there is no basis to overturn the trial court's 
finding on appeal as clearly erroneous. 
POINT H 
KRAATZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
EXTRACONTRACTUAL DAMAGES 
This Court's prior decision reversed and remanded for "a determination of 
Kraatz's damages under the contract . . . " (Memo Decision, p. 4). This Court did not 
remand for determination of extracontractual damages outside the Contract. In fact, in 
Kraatz's first appeal he asserted the Employee Handbook and benefits thereunder 
should have been added to the integrated Contract (Kraatz 1st Brief, p. 13, 27, 29). In 
his Reply Brief, he requested "remand for damages beyond his health benefits and 
vested stock appreciation rights." (Kraatz Reply Brief, p. 25). However, Kraatz did 
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not raise the other extracontractual damage issues in his first appeal that he now claims 
on his second appeal, e.g., Jazz tickets, warranty income and daughter's tennis lessons. 
Thus, to the extent Kraatz raised claims for extracontractual damages in his first 
appeal, those claims are precluded from consideration on his second appeal because this 
Court limited the scope on remand to "damages under the contract" only. 
Additionally, to the extent he failed to raise those issues in his first appeal, he either 
failed to preserve or he waived those issues, and those claims are also precluded from 
consideration in a second appeal. Issues raised for the first time in the second appeal 
may not be considered. See Bonaparte v. Neff, 838 P.2d 317, 319 (Id. Ct. App. 1992) 
("Because [plaintiff] raises this issue for first time in this second appeal, we may not 
address it."). See also Mercantile First Na'l Bank v. Lee, 790 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Ark. 
1990) ("On second appeal, as in this case, the decision of the first appeal becomes the 
law of the case, and is conclusive of every question of law or fact decided in the former 
appeal, and also of those which may have been, but were not, presented."). This panel 
may not overrule the prior panel's Memo Decision, barring clear error or changed 
conditions. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399, cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 
(1995) (Utah 1994). 
Furthermore, this Court's Memo Decision held "the trial court erred in 
considering extrinsic evidence." Kraatz cites Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., Ill P.2d 
1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) and Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) when 
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arguing that an implied in fact contract was created to supposedly open the door for 
extracontractual damages. However, if extrinsic evidence cannot be used to determine 
whether there was cause for termination, it should not be used to attempt to show 
Kraatz's Contract was orally modified, creating a windfall of extracontractual damages 
for Kraatz. 
Kraatz is claiming "subsequent compensation enhancements" for his daughter's 
tennis lessons, his future golfing plans, St, George home subsidies, Christmas bonuses, 
Jazz tickets, retirement contributions and participation in warranty service contracts. 
Paragraph 3.2 of the Contract, entitled "Additional Compensation," provides: 
"Employee may receive additional compensation within the discretion of Company for 
other services rendered or other duties as assigned by the Company and agreed to by 
Employee." (Emphasis supplied). The trial court already concluded there was no basis 
for any additional compensation: 
Section 3.2 of the Agreement requires Plaintiff to provide 
additional consideration for any additional compensation 
Heritage, in its discretion, may provide. Plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate any evidence of further consideration given by him 
for any additional compensation or perks received during his 
employment. The use of Jazz tickets, payments for Plaintiffs 
daughter's tennis lessons, participation in service contract 
companies of Lariat and Ryan, retirement, Christmas bonus, or 
St. George home subsidy are not 'compensation' under the 
Agreement. (R. 5001). 
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This conclusion was not invalidated or reversed by this Court's Memo Decision. In 
fact, as set forth above, those claims are not within the scope of this Court's remand for 
"a determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract." 
The evidence adduced also does not support Kraatz's claims. He admitted the 
following at trial: B. Wilkinson never promised to indefinitely pay the differential 
between the rental of St. George home and the mortgage on his Salt Lake home (R. 
1859); the $500 Christmas bonus was not in his written Contract (R. 1865); the Jazz 
tickets were not included in his written Contract and B. Wilkinson determined who got 
Jazz tickets (R. 2142-45 & Ex. 38); the retirement benefit contributions were not in his 
written Contract (R. 1865); and Kraatz admitted he did not provide any additional 
consideration for warranty income. (R. 1857-58). Thus, there is no evidentiary7 or 
legal bases for these claims. Kraatz asserts in his brief there was no evidence presented 
that the 401(k) plan and Christmas bonuses were modified or terminated after he left. 
However, there was no evidence they continued unmodified. In fact, Kraatz did not 
7
 This Court's decision in the first appeal did not disturb the trial court's finding that: 
"Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence that the parties modified the 
Agreement to include any benefits, perks, or compensation not specifically stated in the 
Agreement." (R. 1710-11). Kraatz's claim for Christmas bonuses under Heritage's 
Employee Handbook ignores the trial court's conclusion, also undisturbed on appeal, 
that the parties intended the Contract to be integrated. Kraatz admitted there was no 
mention of Exhibit 135 [Employee Handbook] in the Contract, and he also admitted he 
did not know of the existence of the Employee Handbook at that time. (R. 1843). 
Also, Kraatz testified the Contract between the parties did not include the corporate 
policy manual. (R. 1843-44 & Ex. 135). 
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present any evidence on these issues at all. 
Assuming, arguendo, there is a legal basis for any additional compensation, it 
was "within the discretion" of Heritage. As this Court declared, "The ordinary 
meaning of contract terms is often best determined through standard, non-legal 
dictionaries." (Memo Decision, p. 2). Discretion is defined as follows: 
Liberty of action; freedom in the exercise of judgment. Webster's 
New Int'l Comprehensive Dictionary 365 (1999). 
Any extracontractual or discretionary benefit Kraatz may have occasionally enjoyed 
while at Heritage ended when he was terminated. Just as Heritage had the discretion to 
grant additional compensation, it had the discretion to withhold it. Parties may reserve 
discretion in compensation in an employment Contract. 
In Namad v. Salomon, Inc., 147 A.D.2d 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), the 
Employment Contract explicitly reserved "other compensation and entitlements, if any, 
. . . shall be at the discretion of the management." In denying the employee's claim for 
additional compensation, the Namad court noted, "the written employment contract 
explicitly reserves to management complete discretion as to the awarding of any 
compensation guaranteed in the employment contract itself." Id. at 387. Similarly, 
although Kraatz may have received some of these benefits at the discretion of Heritage 
during his employment, such discretion may be freely withheld in the exercise of 
Heritage's judgment and cannot form a basis to award additional damages claimed as an 
entitlement. 
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Also, these u subsequent compensation enhancement" claims were not reasonably 
foreseeable by Heritage at the time the Contract was entered into because they were 
discretionary and Heritage had no obligation to provide these benefits to Kraatz under 
the Contract.8 While Kraatz recognizes the foreseeability limitation, he failed to define 
it. 
In Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 624 (Utah 
1979), the Utah Supreme Court held *[m]ere knowledge of possible harm is not 
enough; the defendant must have reason to foresee, as a probable result of the breach, 
the damages claimed." Similarly, in this case Heritage could not have reasonably 
foreseen any liability for benefits that were not required to be given under the Contract. 
It is not foreseeable under these circumstances that discretionary benefits would 
become entitlements to Kraatz. Not all claims for consequential damages are 
foreseeable or allowed. Ranch Homes involved the breach of a real estate option 
contract. The Supreme Court concluded that costs incurred by the buyer for 
architectural and engineering plans, managerial services, and the design of a logo and 
brochure were neither foreseeable nor reasonable and would not support an award of 
consequential damages. Id. at 625-66. See also Castillo v. Atlanta Cos. Co., 939 P.2d 
8
 Kraatz cites Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 n.2 (Utah 1991) for the 
proposition that continued performance of services was sufficient consideration to 
convert the items that were dispensed with discretion by Heritage into entitlements. 
There is no evidence, however, that Heritage's discretion was modified or destroyed. 
Thus Brehany adds nothing to the inquiry. 
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1204, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding plaintiff in uninsured motorist case not 
entitled to lost use of vehicle even though foreseeable because they failed to establish 
how many days they had actual need). 
Assuming arguendo Kraatz could show entitlement and reasonable foreseeability 
for his daughter's tennis lessons, Jazz tickets, Christmas bonuses, etc., he has woeftilly 
failed in his burden to show the alleged damage with the requisite specificity and 
certainty to recover anything. These claims are also far too speculative to support an 
award of damages. See Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986) 
(holding damages awarded must be based rationally, not on speculation). 
POINT in 
KRAATZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES FOR EXPERT 
WITNESS FEES AND COSTS 
Kraatz is claiming expert witness fees of $48,186.26. The Contract provides 
"the defaulting party shall pay. . . reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, 
and/or deposition costs . . . ." The word "reasonable" modifies not only attorney fees, 
but also "expert witness fees and/or deposition costs." 
In State v. Billings, 242 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1976), the Iowa Supreme Court 
construed a criminal statute with grammatical construction similar to the Contract in 
this case. In Billings, the statute read as follows: 
Whoever, after consenting to the use of a motor vehicle, . . . 
shall, with intent to defraud, abandon such vehicle or willfully 
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refuse or willfully neglect to redeliver such vehicle as agreed, 
shall be guilty of a felony . . . . 
Id. at 737. The trial court ruled the State did not need to prove intent to defraud. 
However, the Iowa Supreme Court held "intent to defraud" was an element of the 
crime set forth above because "with intent to defraud" was set off by commas and 
"precedes and modifies the three verbs delineating the disjunctive means by which the 
crime may be committed." Id. at 737. Likewise, in this case, "reasonable" precedes 
"expert witness fees," is set off by commas, and precedes and modifies three nouns 
delineating the conjunctive means by which reasonable fees and costs shall be assessed. 
Accordingly, to receive expert witness fees, Kraatz must show the fees were 
reasonable. See Sinclair v. Insurance Company of North America, 609 F. Supp. 397, 
409 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding "charge for expert witness fees will be denied because 
the experts did not testify at trial, their testimony was not reasonably necessary to the 
prosecution of the case and neither consultant provided information that counsel could 
not have developed from the known information."). In this case, Kraatz retained two 
experts, Walter Hall and Kent G. Schmitz, who neither testified at trial, were ever 
deposed or added any known quantum to the development of this case. (R. 5002). 
Thus, there is no reasonable basis for awarding fees for these two "experts." (The trial 
court already awarded in excess of $12,000 for Kraatz's experts). 
A significant part of Kraatz's cost claim is for deposition and witness fees 
($13,318.79). However, Kraatz is only entitled to "reasonable" deposition costs. See 
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Board of Commissioners v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1272 (Utah 1997). The 
determination of whether deposition costs are taxable is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court. Id. The general rule is "that a party may recover deposition costs as 
long as the trial court is persuaded that the depositions were taken in good faith and, in 
light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and 
presentation of the case." Id. (Citation omitted). In Peterson, the Utah Supreme Court 
held the prevailing party was not entitled to deposition costs because they were not 
reasonable and necessary to the development of the case. Id. 
Kraatz took 17 separate depositions9 in this case, however, only 5 of these 
witnesses testified at trial. B. Wilkinson (R. 1770); J.J. Wilkinson (R. 2345); L. Miller 
(R. 2071); J. Jensen (R. 2400); and C. Christian (R. 2161). Most of these depositions 
taken by Kraatz where not necessary or even helpful in prosecuting his breach of 
contract claim—the only cause of action on which Kraatz succeeded. For example, the 
depositions regarding extracontractual warranty payments were unnecessary because the 
Contract did not provide any such benefit. Thus, the depositions of Timothy Dunne and 
others from Ryan were unnecessary. Kraatz may not recover time spent by counsel in 
preparing for and conducting depositions that were not related to or essential for 
9
 O. Bryan Wilkinson; Jeff Wilkinson; Larry H. Miller; Jeff Jensen; Clark Christian; 
Helen Green; Matthew Bryan Wilkinson, Roland Fidel; Joe Ballenger; Jeff Gorringe; 
Andy Bresolin; Jerry Hayes; Pat Davis; Thomas LaPointe; Timothy Dunne; Michael 
Gibbons; Shay Curtis. The first five were the only ones to testify at trial. 
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development of allowed damages under the Contract against Heritage. 
The award of costs sought by Kraatz must also be reasonable. In arguing for 
unreasonable costs, Kraatz urges that the language of the Contract means literally all 
expenses and costs, even when this interpretation belies the intent of the parties and the 
factual context in which the words are used. The word "all" as used in the Contract 
should not be read in a technical, limited and literal sense. Rather, the word "alT must 
be interpreted in the context of the parties' entire agreement so as to ascertain and give 
effect to such intent. See Crestview Bowl, Inc., supra; DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 
(Utah 1978). 
In State v. School Dist. No J, 348 P.2d 797 (1960), the Supreme Court of 
Montana was faced with a question of construction identical to the instant case. The 
Montana Constitution provided that: 
The public free schools of the state shall be open to aU children and 
youth between the ages of six and twenty-one years. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id., at 800 (quoting, Const. Of Montana, Art. XI, § 7). A writ of mandamus 
had been sought by the parents of a young girl who, under a school board rule, 
had been denied admission to the first grade. The applicable rule allowed 
children who reached the age of six prior to November 15 of any year to be 
admitted to elementary school at the commencement of the fall term in 
September of that year. The child in question missed the cut-off date by three 
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days. In upholding the school board's decision denying admission, the Montana 
Supreme Court stated: 
[W]e shall examine the wording of the Constitution and statutes to 
determine what was meant by the framers of the Constitution. In 
other words, what does the term 'all' mean? Should it be taken in 
its universal and omnibus sense, that is, literally all? Or rather, 
was it meant to be limited and qualified to conform to good reason 
to carry out the other purposes of the Constitution such as to have a 
general, uniform and thorough system of public schools? 
We hold the later to be proper interpretation. * * * It would be 
very easy to cite examples of absurd results if such a literal 
interpretation were made, Statutory or constitutional construction 
should not lead to absurd results if a reasonable construction will 
avoid it. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 801. To a similar effect, see also, Myer v. Ada County, 293 P. 322 (Idaho 1930). 
The specific language of the Contract provides the prevailing party is entitled to 
"costs, reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees and/or deposition costs. . . . " 
Necessarily, the term "reasonable" must also apply to the term costs. Contract 
language must be read to harmonize provisions together. See Elm, Inc. v. M.T. 
Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89 
(Utah 1999), (holding "the contract should be read as a whole, in an attempt to 
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions"). Moreover, Courts have 
the authority, if not the obligation, to imply reasonable terms when interpreting 
contracts. See Coulter v. Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998) 
(implying reasonable time requirement where contract failed to specify time for 
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performance). Finally, as Kraatz noted on page 39 of his Brief, in every contract there 
is an implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing. Kraatz should not recover 
unreasonable or unnecessary costs. 
By analogy, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits federal courts to tax costs in favor of a 
prevailing party, including court reporter costs, printing costs, witness disbursements 
and the like. The statute does not state that an award of costs thereunder need be 
reasonable. Nonetheless, courts have uniformly held that costs awarded thereunder 
must be reasonable. 
For instance, in Ellis v. University of Kansas Med. Cntr., 2000 WL 1310508, p. 
4 (D.Kan. 2000), decided under § 1920, the court enforced a Tenth Circuit decision 
denying an appellant's request for costs, quoting the appellate court as follows: 
Though 10th Cir.R. 39.1 allows for the taxing of photocopy costs, 
Ellis has not provided any explanation as to the reasonable 
necessity of the photocopies nor has she provided documentation 
regarding those costs. Therefore, we deny Ellis' request to tax the 
photocopy charges. 
Similarly, in this case, Kraatz has not and cannot demonstrate that the additional costs 
he now seeks were reasonable. For example, Kraatz over-worked this case so massively, 
Heritage, for example, is being asked to pay $15,432.55 just for photocopying expenses. 
Was it reasonable for Kraatz to present the trial court with seven three-ring binders of 
potential exhibits on the first morning of trial? Of Kraatz's approximate three hundred 
thirty-three of proposed exhibits, only sixty-six were actually introduced into evidence. 
32 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 1354-1386). Should Heritage reasonably be liable for photocopying expense for 
hundreds of exhibits never introduced? Innumerable other examples exist of prejudgment 
interest requested for unreasonable costs. 
Moreover, Kraatz has also failed to categorize his costs related to his breach of 
contract action from those separate claims and causes of action upon which he failed to 
prevail. Clearly, Kraatz is not entided to costs for claims other than breach of contract. 
POINT IV 
KRAATZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES FOR 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
Heritage admits Kraatz is entided to prejudgment interest on his base salary, 
fixed yearly bonus, demonstrator automobile and health insurance premiums and 
unreimbursed health care costs. Kraatz's other claims for prejudgment interest are not 
supported by Utah law or the facts of this case. Kraatz is only entided to prejudgment 
interest for damages that are complete and capable of calculation with precision as of a 
particular time. Kraatz is not entided to prejudgment interest where damages are 
incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy. See Klinger v. 
Kightty, 889 P. 2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding 
prejudgment interest is not allowed "where damages are incomplete or cannot be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy"). Furthermore, while the evidence may be 
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sufficient to support a damage award, a higher standard of certainty is required to 
sustain prejudgment interest. See Price-Orem 784 P.2d at 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding u[w]hile the basis of the 'formula' used to determine . . . lost profits may have 
been sufficient for the jury to render a verdict in [Price-Orem's] favor . . . it is too 
speculative to allow for the addition of prejudgment interest."). 
Kraatz cites Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Land & Forestry, 
921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997), for the general 
policy statement behind prejudgment interest. Heritage does not disagree with the 
policy of awarding prejudgment interest where the amount owing is liquidated and 
fixed. However, where the amount is not liquidated and fixed, and where there is 
conflicting testimony and uncertainty about the amount owing, prejudgment interest is 
not appropriate. See James Constrs., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing "when damages are uncertain or speculative until 
fixed by the factfinder, Utah courts have refused to award prejudgment interest"). 
Under all these authorities, prejudgment interest is not appropriate for stock 
appreciation rights, yearly bonuses based on profit, subsequent compensation 
enhancements, attorney fees, expert witness fees or costs. Indeed, Kraatz continues to 
make arguments for accounting adjustments (Exs. 302 & 328) regarding the valuation 
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of Heritage.10 The testimony concerning yearly bonus was and still is in conflict. At 
trial, any amounts due for stock appreciation were unascertainable and hotly disputed. 
Likewise, prejudgment interest is not appropriate for "subsequent compensation 
enhancements.n Even if principal damages could be awarded for these claims,11 which 
Heritage strenuously resists, prejudgment interest is too incomplete and speculative to 
be calculated with mathematical accuracy. For example, Kraatz had not used the 
Hidden Valley Country Club for business while employed by Heritage, yet he 
speculates about his future intent to play three golf trips per year taking two guests and 
renting a cart. (Ex. 302, Wisan Work Sch. A-1.5). (R. 2131). This unsubstantiated 
statement of future intent is subject to the trial court's assessment of reasonableness and 
credibility, as well as a determination whether such claims are wholly speculative. 
Prejudgment interest cannot be claimed on attorney fees under this Court's 
decision in James Constrs., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), holding "when damages [such as attorney fees] are uncertain or 
speculative until fixed by the fact-finder, Utah courts have refused to award 
prejudgment interest." Attorney fees are subject to a reasonableness determination 
10
 The Contract recognizes the uncertain nature of this calculation. It provides fair 
market value may be determined by mutual agreement and, if the parties are unable to 
agree, each shall elect one qualified business appraiser and the two shall select a third. 
(R. 4068-69). Until a neutral appraiser is selected and two of the three appraisers 
agree, fair market value at the time of the termination is uncertain. 
11
 As the trial court determined, there was no consideration for subsequent 
compensation enhancement within the discretion of the Company. (R. 5001-02). 
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required by law in the language of the Contract. Therefore, they are not capable of 
calculation with mathematical certainty before fixed by the trial court. 
Kraatz cites to First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 
1982) for the proposition that prejudgment interest would apply to attorney fees because 
the amount is fixed as of the time of claimed damages.12 However, that case provides 
no guidance regarding prejudgment interest on attorney fees. While the defendant in 
J.B.J. Feedyards was awarded $10,000 of his $77,000 accrued attorney fees, with 
prejudgment interest on the $10,000, there is no indication how the Court assessed 
prejudgment interest, and whether the attorney fees were subject to a reasonableness 
analysis. Id. at 597-98, 600. 
Kraatz also cites to Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 2001 Ut App 397, 
38 P.3d 984, in support of his claim for prejudgment interest on attorney fees. In 
Debry, the Court ordered prejudgment interest on past due attorney fees in a divorce 
case where the client admitted to both the trial court and this Court that the fees 
charged were "reasonable." Id. at \ 3, 988. Because there was no dispute as to 
whether the attorney fees were reasonable, and because the client delayed paying 
amounts clearly owed under the contract, prejudgment interest on past due attorney fees 
12
 Implicit in Kraatz's argument would be the suggestion that this panel deciding his 
appeal should and could overrule the prior panel's decision in James Constrs., denying 
prejudgment interest on attorney fees. However, overruling another panel's decision is 
only to be undertaken for clear error or changed conditions. See State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). 
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were awarded. Id. at 991. In the instant case, there is no agreement or admission that 
the attorney fees charged were reasonable, indeed, that is one of the major issues in the 
present appeal. Accordingly, unlike Debry, Kraatz is not entitled to prejudgment 
interest on attorney fees because the reasonableness of those fees is at issue. 
We know from James Constrs., Inc. that attorney fees are not fixed and definite 
enough to support a prejudgment interest award until they have gone through the 
process of determining reasonableness. Like James Constrs., Inc. Kraatz's attorney fee 
claim is subject to a reasonableness analysis by the trier of fact, and therefore, there is 
no proper basis for awarding prejudgment interest, particularly where the attorney fees 
incurred by Kraatz were unreasonable and excessive. 
Those fees could not, and in fact, are not determinable with mathematical 
accuracy until and unless a prior determination of reasonableness is made. Like 
prejudgment interest on attorney fees, the expert witness fees and costs in this case are 
also subject to a reasonableness determination that precludes prejudgment interest. See 
analysis of expert witness fees and costs, supra. 
Numerous errors also exist with Kraatz's attempts at arithmetic. Prejudgment 
interest has been charged on expert fees from the date those fees were billed to Kraatz, 
rather than the dates paid. For example, the first billing from Mark D. Schmitz & 
Associates is dated March 12, 1996, is the very date upon which Kraatz starts to charge 
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prejudgment interest, (R. 4233-34). The same is true of the other experts. (See R. 
4239; 4295 (Wisan); 4300-01 (Hall); 4311-12 (Schmidt)). 
In fact, Hall and Schmitz's invoices are submitted "per our agreement." Kraatz 
has failed, however, to produce those agreements. Are any experts entided under their 
agreements to prejudgment interest? If so, after what past due date does it start 
accruing? Bruce Wisan received monthly payments from Kraatz, yet his invoices failed 
to charge any interest. (R. 4241-4295). Is Heritage being asked to pay for interest 
when none was charged to Kraatz? Heritage should not have to pay for prejudgment 
interest if Kraatz is not being charged interest. See Alvarado v. Rice, 614 So.2d 498, 
499-500 (Fla. 1993) (holding plaintiff in personal injury case who had not paid medical 
bills yet and was not being charged interest was not entided to prejudgment interest for 
past medical expenses). 
Kraatz asserts prejudgment interest begins when the obligation is "incurred." 
(See Kraatz Brief, p. 49, n.3). The Contract provides: "the defaulting party shall pay 
all expenses and costs incurred by the other party in enforcing the terms hereof. . . . " 
(R. 4065). However, Webster's New Comprehensive Int'l Dictionary, 642 (1999) 
defines incurred as "To meet with or become subject to, as unpleasant consequences, 
especially through one's own action; bring upon oneself." Because Kraatz has not 
proven he was charged interest on his expert fees, he is not entided to prejudgment 
interest. 
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Interest is also being claimed for all costs. Was Kraatz obligated to pay costs? 
Was he obligated to pay all costs regardless of reasonableness? Was he obligated to 
pay interest on costs? In the Attorneys Fee Agreement ("Retainer Agreement") that 
Heritage has moved to become part of the record on appeal, the responsibility for the 
costs was transferred to Kraatz's counsel. Pertinent portions of the Retainer Agreement 
provide as follows: 
3. The Client agrees to pay the Attorneys for the 
services of the Attorneys Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) plus 
a contingent fee equal to one-third of any recovery, before 
reimbursement or deduction of out-of-pocket costs . . . 
4. All out—of--pocket costs incurred by the Attorneys in 
prosecuting the Client's claim, including all court or agency filing 
fees, service of process fees, investigatory costs, deposition costs, 
reproduction costs, telephone tolls, travel expenses and the like, 
shall be recovered by Attorneys out of any recovery in addition to 
Attorneys' one-third contingency fee. The Attorneys agree to pay 
any such costs and hold Client harmless therefrom . . . 
11. The Client hereby assigns to the Attorneys, to the 
extent of Attorneys' fees and the Attorneys' out-of-pocket cost 
disbursements, any recovery in favor of the Client by way of 
settlement, suit, administrative proceedings or otherwise and the 
Client hereby agrees that Attorneys may retain the Attorneys' share 
of such recovery. (See tab 3 of Appendix). 
As part of their contingency agreement, Kraatz's counsel assumed liability for 
entitlement of all costs. Since Kraatz incurred no liability, he is not now entitled to 
prejudgment interest on any costs? See Alvarado, supra. By substituting themselves 
for Kraatz, his counsel severed the privity of contract between Kraatz and Heritage for 
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the payment of costs and prejudgment interest thereon. There is no privity of contract 
between Kraatz's counsel and Heritage. Again, why should Heritage be required to 
pay prejudgment interest on costs if Kraatz is not? 
Furthermore, this Court issued its Memo Decision in May of 1999, yet Kraatz 
waited until June 2, 2000 to deliver to Heritage his Motion for Determination of 
Damages. A party causing delay is not entkled to prejudgment interest from the delay. 
In Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
Even assuming that interest may be awarded in cases such as this, 
[counterclaimant's] conduct precludes an award of interest. The 
trial court stated, ' . . . a substantial number of the delays, in this 
long-pending case were at the instance of or agreed to by the 
[counterclaimant].' 
Finally, Kraatz cites to Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Company, Inc., 290 U.S. 163, 168-
69 (1933) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 354(2) in support of his 
argument for prejudgment interest. In Funkhouser, the issue resolved by the U.S. 
Supreme Court was whether a New York statute allowing prejudgment interest was 
constitutional. The Funkhouser Court ultimately concluded the statute was 
constitutional. It has no controlling authority in the instant case because prejudgment 
interest is awarded in New York by statute even where the claim is uunliquidated." 
Thus, Funkhouser is distinguishable. 
Also, Kraatz's argument from the Restatement (Second) that prejudgment 
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interest should be allowed "as justice requires" is inapplicable in this case. In fact, 
Comment d to section 354 states such a determination should be made "in the light of 
all the circumstances, including any deficiencies in the performance of the injured party 
and any unreasonableness in the demands made by him." In this case, Kraatz's 
demands were unreasonable. Kraatz twice refused settlement offers prior to trial for 
principal amounts more than double the award he obtained from the trial court. Thus, 
justice requires no further prejudgment interest for Kraatz in this case. 
POINT V 
KRAATZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES FOR 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX ADJUSTMENTS 
Kraatz's claim for a CPI adjustment damages under Law v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass 9n, 185 F.R.D. 324 (D. Kan. 1999) is inapplicable to this case. Law was a 
federal antitrust case that is factually dissimilar to this case. In Law, no prejudgment 
interest was permitted a private party under federal antitrust litigation in the absence of 
a bad faith delay. Id. 347. No other jurisdiction has cited to this case and no Utah 
Court has adopted this method of augmenting antitrust damages to a breach of contract 
case. The law in Utah is clear. Prejudgment interest is not allowed unless damages are 
sufficiently calculable with mathematical accuracy. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING $432,941.36 IN ATTORNEY 
FEESTOKRAATZ 
1. Pursuit of Extracontractual Damages. Kraatz is not entitled to attorney 
fees for pursuing extracontractual claims. This Court's Memo Decision "reverse[d] 
and remand[ed] for a determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract, including 
reasonable attorney fees." (Memo Decision, p. 4). In his first appeal, Kraatz 
addressed his claim for damages and benefits under the Employment Manual (Kraatz 
first brief, pp, 13, 27, 29) and in his Reply Brief he requested "damages beyond his 
health benefits and vested stock appreciation rights." (Kraatz Reply Brief, p. 25). 
The prior panel of this Court explicidy rejected those arguments and remanded "for 
damages under the contract"—not for a determination of damages from all theories 
outside the Contract. To the extent Kraatz failed to raise his other claims for 
extracontractual damages, he failed to preserve and waived those issues and is not 
entitied to appeal from an adverse decision in the trial court. See Mercantile First Natl 
Bank, 790 S.W.2d at 919 ("On second appeal, as in this case, the decision of the first 
appeal becomes the law of the case, and is conclusive of every question of law or fact 
decided in the former appeal, and also of those which may have been, but were not, 
presented."); but see Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (holding panel of court may overrule 
another panel for clear error or changed conditions). 
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Thus, Kraatz's claim for attorney fees must be reduced to account for time spent 
in pursuit of extracontractual claims, such as 401 (k) contributions, season tickets to the 
Utah Jazz, annual Christmas bonuses, reimbursement for St. George home, warranty 
income, tennis lessons for his daughter, and private (non-business) use of the Sports 
Mall and Hidden Valley Country Club. Kraatz, however, never reduced his attorney 
fees for these extracontractual damage claims. 
2. Unsuccessful Claims. Kraatz is not entided to attorney fees for his six 
unsuccessful claims, including his claims against B. Wilkinson and J.J. Wilkinson. He 
is only entided to attorney fees spent pursuing his sole successful claim for breach of 
contract against Heritage. 
An award of attorney fees must distinguish between fees incurred in connection 
with successful and unsuccessful claims and between contractual claims and non-
contractual claims. In Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
the party must categorize the time and fees expended for (1) 
successful claims for which there may be an entidement to 
attorney's fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would 
have been an entidement to attorney's fees had the claims been 
successful, (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to 
attorney's fees. . . . Claims must also be categorized according 
to the various opposing parties. 
Id. at53. 
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Kraatz partially recognized these principles in withdrawing the following time: 
$15,691.50 Claims Against Individuals 
2,778.75 Prefiling Claims Assessment 
425.00 Pleading Drafting 
2,430.10 Trial Brief (18% reduction) 
5,860.50 Trial Preparation & Presentation 
3.651.79 Post Trial Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law 
$30,837.64 TOTAL AMOUNT VOLUNTARILY WITHDRAWN (R. 4970-
73). 
Although Kraatz voluntarily reduced his claim for attorney fees as set forth above in 
small amounts (6.65%), he did not withdraw any time for his six unsuccessful claims 
from his discovery and damage analysis ($130,557.75) or his first appeal 
($139,823.50). (R. 4970-73). The time he withdrew for trial presentation was based 
on the number of transcript pages used for that witness. That is not a valid indicator of 
the proper fee reduction. 
Moreover, Kraatz has not reduced his fees at all for time spent in pursuit of 
extracontractual damage claims. Kraatz is not entitied to receive attorney fees for time 
spent pursuing the unsuccessful or extracontractual claims just because he achieved 
limited success on one cause of action. In Turtle Management v. Haggis Management, 
Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
When a plaintiff has a substantial claim against one defendant, he 
should not have a free ride to assert claims against other 
defendants with the expectation that the target defendant will end 
up paying all attorney's fees, even those related to unsuccessful 
and perhaps frivolous claims. 
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Examples of time entries13 that should be excluded because they include time 
spent on unsuccessful claims, claims against individuals, or issues unrelated to the case 
are as follows: 
12/18/92 JJD Review Employment Agreement and 
other materials in case file; revise complaint to reflect facts re 
transactions with Heritage before creation of Employment; begin to 
revise all causes of action. 4.00 hours, $360.00 (R. 4345). 
01/06/93 KBL Review of County Bar Cost 
Containment Guidelines; preparation of agenda for office 
conference with opposing counsel and attendance at conference; 
telephone conference with opposing counsel re their agreement to 
accept service of process. 1.50 hours, $232.50 (R. 4348). 
08/20/96 JJD Continue revising introduction section 
of trial brief; revise issues of law and burden of proof sections of 
trial brief; begin revising argument sections of appellate brief; 
receive and review draft of joint pretrial order from opposing 
counsel; conduct research re right to recover punitive damages for 
breach of contract under extraordinary circumstances; conference 
with MNZ and opposing counsel re case procedural matters. 8.50 
hours, $935.00 (R. 4436). 
13
 Analyzing Kraatz's time is difficult given that entries for several tasks are lumped 
together without apportioning time for individual tasks. See Webb v. James, 967 F. 
Supp. 320, 324 (N.D. 111. 1997) (disallowing time entries where "multiple tasks were 
described for a single block of billed time—in many of those instances, where it was 
impossible to estimate an appropriate sum to subtract, the Court disallowed the entire 
amount."); In re Wiedau's Inc., 78 B.R. 904, 908 (Bankr. S.D. Ill 1987) ("Each type 
of service should be listed with the corresponding specific time allotment. Otherwise, 
the Court is unable to determine whether or not the time spent on a specific task was 
reasonable. Therefore, services which have been lumped together are not 
compensable."). Thus, Kraatz's claims where the entries are lumped together should 
be disallowed. 
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08/22/96 JJD Attorney conference re case update and 
assignment to research whether corporate officers have privilege 
against tort claims; conduct research re same; draft section to trial 
brief discussing liability of corporate officers for tort claims; 
intermittent attorney conferences re case updates; conduct research 
re rule of contract construction to give meaning to all provisions of 
contract; further revise entire trial brief; review materials in case 
file and prepare for direct examination of L. Terry. 7.40 hours, 
$814.00 ad.). 
Additional examples are included in tab 4 of the Appendix. 
3. Results Obtained - Where the Award of Fees Exceeds the Principal Sum 
Recovered by Three and One-Half Times. 
An attorney fee award must be reasonably based upon a number of factors. A 
trial court is not bound by the fees requested in an affidavit and the appropriateness of 
the requested fee must be evaluated before a reasonable fee is set.14 See Cafferty v. 
Hughes, 2002 UT. Ct. App. 105, 1 26, 2002 WL 534793, p.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
14
 It is doubtful Kraatz's counsel would have accumulated such an enormous bill if 
Kraatz were responsible for paying it. In U.S. v. Self, 814 F.Supp. 1442, 1446 (D. 
Utah 1992), Judge Greene also noted that lawyers bill more time against their 
opponents compared to what they bill a client who pays the bill. Id. at 1445. Since 
counsel's out-of-court time was many times greater than in-court time, the Court 
ultimately decided to reduce the attorney fees to time spent in court plus an average of 
2 to 2.5 times in-court time. Id. 1446-47. Under this standard, Kraatz would only be 
entitled to attorney fees for the actual time spent in court approximately 60 hours for a 
(four-day bench trial plus hearings), times double that amount or 120 hours for out-of 
court time, for a total of 180 hours of attorney time. When multiplied by an average 
rate of $175 per hour this amounts to $31,500.00. 
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These factors include, but are not limited to: 
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting a case, the reasonableness of the number of hours 
spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality of 
similarly services, the amount involved in the case and the result 
obtained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). See also Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). 
Analyzing first the results obtained, leads to the conclusion the trial court abused 
its discretion by awarding excessive attorney fees to Kraatz. Kraatz's complaint asked 
for total damages of $3,507,980 from all named defendants, exclusive of attorney fees 
and costs. He ultimately succeeded on one claim against only one defendant and 
recovered the principal amount of $124,118.56. His recovery is only 3.5% of his 
original demand. While no single factor is determinative in arriving at a reasonable fee, 
lack of results is certainly a highly relevant factor. 
Many cases have considered the amount in controversy in determining a 
reasonable fee. See Diamond D Enterprises USA, Inc. v. Steinsvaag, 979 F.2d 14 (2d 
Cir.1992), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993), (holding the amount in controversy in 
the litigation nis generally the ceiling on the fees that may be awarded pursuant to a fee-
shifting clause"); F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1250 
(2d Cir.1987) (citing "general rule in New York, i.e., that it is rarely proper to award 
fees in an amount that exceeds the amount involved in the litigation"); Elizabeth-
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Perkins, Inc. v. Morgan Express, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 
1977) ("We recognize also that the ultimate amount of recovery is a factor to be 
considered in fixing the amount of the fee."). 
Further, In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316-17 (Utah 1998) the Utah 
Supreme Court also included consideration of the Rules of Professional Responsibility 
in determining whether attorney fees are appropriate. Relevant portions of Rule 1.5, 
reads as follows: 
RULE 1.5 FEES 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when, after a 
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a 
definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. 
Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a 
fee include the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained: 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.5 (emphasis added). Thus, the Rules of Professional 
Responsibility also preclude excessive fees and consider the result obtained. All 
authorities prompt the conclusion that only under exceptional circumstances (not 
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present here) should a "reasonable" attorney fee exceed the principal amount 
recovered. 
4. Inefficiency of Counsel and Unreasonableness of Hours. 
a. Time Spent Determining Judge Frederick's Reversal Rate. 
Part of the attorney fees awarded were for determining Judge Frederick's 
reversal record on appeal. As near as can be determined (since nearly all of the entries 
include multiple tasks (see fti.13 supra)), the judgment included 41.60 hours or $4,596 
spent on efforts to ascertain Judge Frederick's "batting average" on appeal. These 
efforts are unreasonable and Kraatz should not recover anything for such an endeavor. 
Examples are: 
09/23/96 JJD Attorney conference re. strategy for 
determining whether to appeal Judge Frederick's ruling; obtain list 
of cases involving Judge Frederick, and begin determining how 
Judge Frederick rules and whether he was affirmed or reversed on 
appeal. 5.0 hours, $550.00 (R. 4458). 
09/24/96 JJD Continue to review cases involving 
Judge Frederick to determine how he ruled and whether he was 
affirmed or reversed on appeal; receive and review transcript of 
ruling. 2.80 hours, $308.00 (R. 4458). 
10/02/96 JJD Attorney conference re review of 
transcript of Judge Frederick's ruling, and case strategy; determine 
number of decisions of Judge Frederick after bench trial which 
were ultimately affirmed or reversed; review cases decided by 
Judge Frederick involving bench trials which were either affirmed 
or reversed; conduct research re procedure for seeking 
disqualification of judge. 6.10 hours, $671.00 (R. 4458). 
Additional examples are included in tab 5 of Appendix. 
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In Garden State Auto Park Pontiac GMC Truck, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems 
Corp., 31 F.Supp.2d 378 (D.NJ. 1998), the identical issue was addressed where a 
party's counsel spent the comparatively paltry sum of $519 in attorney time 
"researching background information and reversal rates" of judges. Id. at 387. The 
Federal District Court disallowed all attorney fees for that pursuit, holding *[p]ut 
simply, requiring [plaintiff] to reimburse [defendant] for time spent researching this 
Court's reversal rates and the backgrounds of certain Third Circuit judges is beyond the 
realm of reasonableness." Id. at 387. 
b. Time Spent on Travel is Not Fully Compensable. 
Kraatz's counsel spent substantial time traveling to review records and 
documents. Time spent travelling should not be paid at the full rate of the attorney. 
See Mr. X v. New York Dept. Educ., 20 F. Supp.2d 561, 564 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) 
("[c]ourts in this circuit generally reimburse attorneys for travel time at 50% of their 
hourly rates"). There are numerous time entries that include travel by Kraatz's 
attorneys that should be reduced as follows: 
07/26/93 JJD Travel to Kinkos and compare copies of 
documents to originals to determine whether documents were 
copied correcdy; bring all copies of documents back to office. 
4.30 hours, $387.00 (R. 4363). 
08/25/93 JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda and 
review accounts payable documents. 4.10 hours, $369.00 (R. 
4365). 
08/27/93 JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda and 
review accounts payable ledgers and other documents. 3.90 hours, 
$351.00 (R. 4365). 
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Additional examples of travel time entries are included as tab 6 of the Appendix, 
c. Two or More Attorneys on the Same Task. 
There are many instances where two attorneys attended depositions or other 
matters where such attendance was duplicative and unnecessary. See U.S. v. Self, 818 
F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (D. Utah 1992) ("Presence of multiple counsel at hearings and 
court proceedings often is duplicative and unnecessary. . . Excessive review of 
documents, motions, memoranda and the work of other counsel may represent lack of 
coordination among counsel or unnecessary overlap of effort for which clients ought 
not to be charged."). Examples of duplicative time entries are as follows: 
01/13/94 KBL Attorneys conference with Kent 
Schmidt. .80 hours, $124.00. 
01/13/94 JJD Gather materials and prepare for 
conference with K. Schmidt; conference with K. Schmidt re 
valuation of dealership; telephone calls to T. Kraatz re arrangement 
of meeting between T. Kraatz and K. Schmidt. 3.10 hours, 
$279.00. 
01/13/94 MNZ Conference with Kent Schmidt re 
valuation of dealership. 3.50 hours, $490.00 (R. 4373). 
03/23/94 MNZ Prepare for and depose JJ Wilkinson. 
5.8 hours, $812.00. 
03/23/94 KBL Attendance at J.J. Wilkinson deposition 
and related attorneys conferences. 1.3 hours, $201.50 (R. 4382). 
03/30/94 MNZ Prepare for and attend second day of 
deposition of JJ Wilkinson; prepare for deposition of Matt 
Wilkinson. 7.50 hours, $1,050. 
03/30/94 KBL Attendance at JJ Wilkinson deposition 
and attorneys conference re same. 4.40 hours, $682.00 (R. 4383). 
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03/31/94 MNZ Prepare for and attend deposition of 
Matt Wilkinson. 5.0 hours, $700.00. 
03/31/94 KBL Attendance at Matt Wilkinson 
deposition and attorneys conference. 3.5 hours, $542.50 (R. 
4383). 
04/06/94 MNZ Prepare for second day of deposition of 
Bry Wilkinson and take deposition. 7.70 hours, $1,078.00. 
04/06/94 KBL Attendance at B. Wilkinson deposition 
and attorneys related conferences. 5.30 hours, $821.50. 
04/06/94 JJD Attend and summarize testimony in 
deposition of B. Wilkinson; conference with M. Zundel and K. 
Linebaugh re deposition strategy. 5.20 hours, $468.00 (R. 4384). 
09/20/96 JJD Travel to and from and attend Judge 
Frederick's ruling; attorney conferences re report on ruling; 
attorney conference re case strategy. 1.70 hours, $187.00. 
09/20/96 WGM Attorney conference re ruling and 
alternatives for further action. .40 hours, $62.00. 
09/20/96 MNZ Appear at court and receive ruling; 
discuss ruling with client and partners. 2.6 hours, $390.00. 
09/20/96 TZ Attend ruling hearing. .70 hours, 
$42.00. 
09/20/96 KBL Attendance at court for ruling. .60 
hours, $99.00. (R. 4453).15 
09/20/96 JMD Post mortem with MNZ. 1.30 hours, 
$214.50. 
Additional examples are included as tab 7 of the Appendix. 
d. Time Spent in Attorney Conferences. 
Kraatz's entries reveal numerous attorney conferences. However, attorneys 
15
 As can be seen in this group of time entries, no less than five people from Plaintiffs 
legal team attended Judge Frederick's ruling. 
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should not recover fees for such attorney conferences, as they are wasteful, duplicative 
and excessive- See O'Rear v. American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, Inc., 
144 F.R.D. 410, 415 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding, "this court finds excessive all of the 
various attorney conferences"); In re Wiedau's, Inc., 78 B.R. 904, 908 (Bankr. S.D. 
111. 1987) ("While some intraoffice conferences may be necessary, no more than one 
attorney may charge for it unless an explanation of each attorney's participation is 
given."). 
Examples of attorney conferences billed are: 
11/10/92 JJD Conference with T. Kraatz re additional 
factual information necessary for drafting demand letter; 
conference with K. Linebaugh and M. Zundel re strategy for 
drafting demand letter. 3.3 hours, $280.50. 
11/10/92 KBL File review and office conference with 
client; attorneys conference re demand letter. 3.5 hours, $525.00. 
11/10/92 MNZ Attend meeting with client re 
preparation of submitting demand letter. 1.5 hours, $195.00 (R. 
4338). 
12/10/92 KBL Attorneys conference re form of 
demand letter. 2.10 hours, $325.50. 
12/10/92 MNZ Conference with K. Linebaugh and J. 
Devashrayee re elements of damage and substance of demand 
letter; revise letter. 3.0 hours, $420.00 (R. 4341). 
06/17/93 KBL Redrafting and editing papers for 
presentation to client; office conference with Mr. And Mrs. Kraatz 
agreeing on settlement approach. 3.10 hours, $480.50. 
06/17/93 MNZ Conference with K. Linebaugh re 
litigation and settlement strategy. 2.80 hours, $392.00 (R. 4351). 
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12/30/93 JJD Conference with K. Linebaugh, M. 
Zundel and T. Kraatz re status of case and case strategy. 3.0 
hours, $270.00 
12/30/93 KBL Attorneys conference with client re 
status of proof and possible settlement strategy. 3.0 hours, 
$465.00. 
12/30/93 MNZ Review financial information prepared 
by Tony and compare income statements over time to identify 
trends and costs of Brys participation in dealership. Conference 
with K. Linebaugh and J. Devashrayee re evidence to support 
allegations of complaints and call to Tony Kraatz re preliminary 
conclusions based upon my review of financial information; call to 
potential expert witnesses. 6.0 hours, $840.00 (R. 4372). 
02/05/94 JJD Conference with M. Zundel, T. Kraatz 
and C. Turner re responses to defendants first set of 
interrogatories, and other case strategy. 2.0 hours, $180.00. 
02/05/94 MNZ Conference with Tony Kraatz, J. 
Devashrayee and C. Turner re responses to discovery requests; 
draft additional responses to defendants interrogatories. 
02/05/94 CT Conference with M. Zundel, J. 
Devashrayee and Tony Kraatz re discovery responses; review 
clients documents. 2.5 hours, $150.00 (R. 4376). 
Time spent in attorney conferences should not be awarded to Kraatz, as they were 
unnecessary, duplicative, and excessive. Many additional examples of attorney 
conferences are included in tab 8 of Appendix. 
5. Rejection of Settlement Offers - For More Than Double the 
Principal Sum Recovered. Kraatz brought suit for $3,507,980 in damages. (R. 19). 
Twice before trial, Heritage offered to settle for a principal sum exceeding by more 
than twice his limited recovery of $124,118.56 principal. Defendants offered to settle 
this matter after filing of the complaint in 1993 for $308,000, which offer was rejected 
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by letter from Kraatz's counsel. (R. 4682; tab 1 of Appendix). Shortly before trial, in 
August, 1996, counsel and the parties met again to discuss settlement. In that 
conference, Defendants' counsel made an opening settlement offer of $325,000. (R. 
4684; tab 2 of Appendix). Kraatz and his counsel, Zundel, were so insulted by this 
offer, they ceased further discussions., made no counter-offer and abruptly left the 
meeting. 
In determining an award of attorney fees, prior offers of settlement should be 
considered. In Greenwich Film Productions, S.A. v. DRGRecords, Inc., 40 USPQ.2d 
1223, 1996 WL 502336 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the plaintiff prevailed in a copyright 
infringement case and was entitled to "reasonable attorney fee" as part the costs by 
statute. Id. at 1. The defendant offered $30,000 to settle the matter before it was filed, 
and the case was later settled for $70,000 on the eve of trial. The Greenwich court held 
that u[s]ince plaintiffs unreasonable demand [$1,000,000] resulted in expensive 
litigation it would be unfair to permit plaintiff to recover the resulting costs." Id. The 
Greenwich court awarded plaintiffs counsel attorney fees of only $10,000 (where 
$259,188.25 in attorney fees and expenses were sought) holding: 
Settlements are to be encouraged and a party to an action in 
which attorney's fees may be awarded should not be allowed to 
believe that it can reject a reasonable settlement offer and still 
recover the full amount of its attorney's fees if ultimately it 
^ recovers little more than the original offer. 
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Id. The Court also went on to state that consideration of negotiations was not a 
violation of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because an attorney fee 
determination was "another purpose" outside the purview of Rule 408. It declared: 
While determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney's 
fees is not specifically mentioned as a purpose for which 
evidence of a settlement offer may be considered, strong public 
policy consideration support its admissibility for that purpose. 
(Citation omitted). 
When considering the recovery Kraatz ultimately obtained in light of the 
settlement offers rejected his attorney fees were excessive. No award should be made 
for fees incurred after the first settlement offer was rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Amended Findings concerning Stock Appreciation Rights, 
extracontractual damages and yearly bonus were not clearly erroneous. The Amended 
Findings on expert witness fees and costs, prejudgment interest and the CPI are well 
supported by the facts and no legal basis exists to reverse those awards. 
The amount awarded to Kraatz for attorney fees should be reduced to more 
accurately reflect the results obtained, to eliminate time spent on unsuccessful claims, 
as well as duplicative, unreasonable and excessive time spent by counsel and to reflect 
his rejection soon after commencement of the litigation and again before trial of 
settlement offers for more than double the principal sum recovered. Finally, since 
Kraatz's counsel agreed to a one-third contingency fee, attorney fees should be limited 
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to $41,372.85 ($124,118.56 + 1/3). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jf^_ day of May, 2002. 
Donald 3. Winder, Esq, 
Gerry B. Holman, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies of the Brief of 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant and Addendum to Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this L^ day of _ r W _ _ _ , 2002, to: 
Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main, #1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael N. Zundel, Esq. 
James A. Boevers, Esq. 
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 
2410\002\appcab\brief.2 ' 
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VIA Pars-nrn-.B! NO. 532-370S 
and FIRST CLASH Marr. 
Dennis V. Haslam 
Winder & Haslam 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Kraatz v. Heritage Honda, et al. 
Dear Dennis: 
This letter will confirm that on July 9, 1993, you orally 
communicated to us the Defendants' latest offer to settle the 
subject litigation. It is our understanding that such offer 
consisted of the following: 
All of B. Wilkinson's interest in 
Lariet Holding valued at approximately $ 85,000 
Cash in the amount of $175,000 
24 monthly installments of 
$2,000 each $ 48,000 
We have discussed the offer with Mr. Kraatz. Please be 
advised that the offer is respectfully rejected. Please be further 
advised that Mr. Kraatz does not wish to make any counter-offer. 
Therefore it should be understood that none of the previous offers 
to settle made by any of the parties or their agents are still 
extant. * 
We believe the case should be settled, and we will never 
foreclose the possibility of settlement. However, we consider the 
Defendants' last offer to be so unrealistic that Mr. Kraatz has no 
alternative but to prosecute his claims. We intend to do that as 
quickly and efficiently as possible. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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July 15, 1993 
Page 2 
We are not s a t i s f i e d with the Defendants' responses to 
our interrogatories. However, that wil l be the subject of another 
l e t t e r direct ly to the Defendants' counsel of record. We w i l l 
i n s i s t that the Defendants promptly give us complete answers to the 
interrogatories , and immediately upon receipt of those supplemental 
responses, we w i l l commence talcing depositions. In the meantime, 
we w i l l begin the document inspection agreed to by the Defendants. 
Even though i t did not result in a sett lement, we 
appreciate you and Mr. Miller meeting with us on June 28, 1993. We 
are sorry that th i s matter could not have been resolved at t h i s 
t ime. 
Kindest personal regards. 
Very truly yours, 
JARDIflE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
• A Professional Corporation 
Kent B Linebaugh 
JBL:c*\L\U33 
cc: Anthony Kraati 
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WINDER &H*w*AM. 
BUSINESS .\HD n i A L AHORNEYS 
SUITE 4000 
17J TEST VX3 SOUTH 
BO. BOX 266S 
SAULAXEcrnr. UTAH MIO-IU* 
FAX 301532-3706 
PHONE aOUZ2-U2Z 
DENNIS V. RASLAM 
August 23, 1996 VTA FACSIMILE 
355-7725 
Michael N. Zundel 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1290 
Re' Kraatz v. Heritage Imports 
Civil No. 930900312 CN 
Dear Mike: 
This letter will confirm our conversation in my office on 
Friday, August 23, 1996 during which we discussed settlement 
of this case. I extended to you an offer from all of the 
defendants of $325,000, in cash. You said, essentially, that 
the offer was not acceptable. I asked you to make a counter-
proposal, and you said that you did not have one to make. 
Very/truly yours, 
DfMtfIS V. HASLAM 
DVH/kr 
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C A R L M. B A R T O N 
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P R I N C E , Y E A T E S &. G E L D Z A H L E R 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
L A W Y E R S 
CITY CENTRE I, SUITE 900 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (80I) 524-IOOO 
TAX IBOI ) 3 2 4 - 1 0 9 8 
PARK CITY OFFICE 
614 MAIN STREET 
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March 2, 2000 
Mr. William Anthony Kraatz 
6374 So. Heughs Canyon Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Re: Retainer of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler and Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough 
Dear Mr. Kraatz: 
In light of the dissolution of the firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn, and the subsequent 
association of Michael N. Zundel with Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, and of Kent B Linebaugh 
with the firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, it is necessary to formalize your 
relationship with those law firms. We are writing this letter to you to accomplish that purpose. 
As you know, before the firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn dissolved, that firm was 
successful in prosecuting an appeal of the adverse ruling received in your case from the trial 
court in 1996. Shortly after the firm dissolved, we received word from the Utah Supreme 
Court that the Defendants' Writ of Certiorari had been denied. 
In order to prosecute your case from this point forward, it is necessary to return to the 
trial court for an evidentiary determination of the damages due you, together with other 
matters such as the determination of the costs and reasonable attorneys' fees which should be 
added to the judgment award. 
Mr. Zundel and Mr. Linebaugh are willing to continue with the prosecution of your 
case pursuant to the Order of Remand from the Court of Appeals. Each of their respective law 
firms propose to undertake your representation by assuming the burdens and obligations of the 
firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn under your retention agreement with that firm. Costs 
incurred by both of these law firms, will be recovered out of any award that the trial court 
may enter in your favor and which is collected by you. This is the same arrangement as under 
your present contract with Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn. 
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Mr. Zundel's and Mr. Linebaugh's firms will be compensated by agreement with the 
firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn as follows: the new firms' attorneys, associates and 
paralegals shall bill their time and shall be entitled to receive 120% of their regular hourly 
rates out of that portion of the damage award and judgment which would otherwise be paid 
to the firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn. This arrangement will not decrease your share of 
the amount collected from what it is under your contract with Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn. 
Although the firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn is in dissolution, the legal entity still 
exists and has a functioning board of directors for the purpose of liquidation. The tfiree law 
firms have agreed to the proposal herein contained. It is important, however, that you also 
consent. If you do consent, please execute this letter where indicated below and return the 
original to me. I will see that Kent Linebaugh, on behalf of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough, gets a copy of the letter bearing your signature. 
Sincerely, 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 




William Anthony Kraatz 
MNZ\L\1163 
File No. 13407-1 
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April 2, 1999 
mzundeffajldlaw. cc<n 
Mr. William Anthony Kraatz 
6374 So. Heughs Canyon Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Re: Kraatz v. Heritage Honda 
Dear Tony: 
Enclosed you will find the following documents: 
1. A copy of the Attorney's Fee Agreement we each signed on October 23, 
1992. (It astounds me to think that this lawsuit will probably go on for more than seven 
years.) 
2. A copy of my letter to you dated November 14, 1996, regarding the 
advisability of the appeal and our request to modify our fee arrangement. 
Paragraph 7 of the Attorney's Fee Agreement makes clear that we agreed that the 
original agreement applied to one trial only and that in the event of an appeal we would 
negotiate in good faith a new agreement under which we would be fairly compensated. 
Because of that 
possibility, we will want to modify the fee agreement to clarify that we receive 1/3 of the total 
award or the attorney's fees awarded by the Court, whichever is greater, or some other 
arrangements which we both agree will be fair. * 
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ATTORNEYS FEE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made as of the 23rd day of October, 
1992, by and between William Anthony Kraatz (the "Client"), and 
Michael N. Zundel and the law firm of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & 
Dunn of 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 (collectively the "Attorneys"). 
1. The Client, in consideration of services performed 
and to be performed by the Attorneys for the Client, hereby retains 
the Attorneys to represent the Client in connection with all claims 
and causes of action accruing in favor of the Client as a result of 
the breach of Client's employment agreement by Heritage Imports, a 
Utah corporation, and related claims which Client may have against 
0. Bryan Wilkinson, individually. 
2. The Client hereby authorizes the Attorneys to take 
whatever action the Attorneys deem advisable in prosecuting any and 
all claims which the Client may have against any and all persons 
arising out of the incident described in paragraph 1, including 
effecting a settlement or compromise, employing other counsel at 
the expense of the Attorneys, and instituting legal proceedings by 
way of complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, third-party action or 
otherwise. It is understood and agreed that the Attorneys will 
consult with the Client with respect to prosecuting the Client's 
claim, and that any settlement or compromise of such claims shall 
be made only with the approval of the Client. 
3. The Client agrees to pay the Attorneys for the 
services of the Attorneys Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) plus a 
contingent fee equal to one-third of any recovery, before 
reimbursement or deduction of out-of-pocket costs, on the Client's 
claims, regardless of whether such recovery is achieved by 
settlement before or after commencement of suit or administrative 
proceedings. However, the Attorneys shall not be compensated with 
respect to any amounts paid to the Client as workers compensation 
or unemployment benefits as a matter of statutory right and without 
the efforts of the Attorneys. In the event of a structured 
settlement (that is a recovery that is payable to the Client over 
a period of time rather than a lump sum), then and in that event, 
the contingent fee to which the Attorneys will be entitled shall be 
equal to one-third of the present value of any such recovery. In 
determining the present value of any such structured settlement, 
the parties agree to rely upon appropriate accounting methods as 
determined by actuaries, economists or other experts in the field. 
The Attorneys' fee computed on the basis of such present value 
shall be due and payable at the time of such settlement. 
4. All out-of-pocket costs incurred by the Attorneys in 
prosecuting the Client's claim/ including all court or agency 
filing fees, service of process fees, investigatory costs, 
deposition costs, reproduction costs, telephone tolls, travel 
expenses and the like, shall be recovered by Attorneys out of any 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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recovery in addition to Attorneys' one-third contingency fee. The 
Attorneys agree to pay any such costs and hold Client harmless 
therefrom, except in the event of termination of Attorneys' 
services as hereinafter provided. The Client agrees that if all or 
any part of such out-of-pocket costs have been paid by another 
source (e.g., insurance), the Client agrees that such source will 
be reimbursed out of any recovery, and the Attorneys are hereby 
authorized to make such disbursements out of any recovery to the 
entities or persons entitled thereto. 
5. Client agrees to hire other professionals who may be 
necessary to prosecute Client's claim, such as accountants or 
appraisers, at Client's own expense. 
6. Recovery, as the term is used herein, shall mean all 
monetary awards, including Attorneys' fees, costs and expenses 
awarded by any court of competent jurisdiction or any 
administrative agency, as well as any special, general and punitive 
damages. 
7. This Agreement is applicable to all proceedings 
through one trial. In the event an appeal and/or a second trial is 
necessary, the parties agree that they will negotiate in good faith 
a new Attorneys' fee Agreement with respect to any such additional 
proceedings. 
8. The Client retains the right to discharge the 
Attorneys from prosecuting the Clients' claims at any time before 
settlement or trial, but in the event of such discharge, the Client 
shall remain obligated for payment of reasonable Attorneys' fees to 
the Attorneys for services performed up to the date of such 
discharge, based on the Attorneys' standard hourly rates, and for 
out-of-pocket expenses paid or incurred by Attorneys in connection 
with Client's claim. If this paragraph becomes applicable, then 
Client shall receive credit against his obligations to Attorneys 
for the $10,000.00 paid in connection with the execution of this 
agreement. 
9. The Attorneys are hereby authorized to investigate 
fully any claims the Client may have with respect to the incidents 
described above. If the Attorneys decide that it is in the 
Client's best interest to file a lawsuit or other legal proceeding 
on behalf of the Client, the Attorneys have the authority to 
prepare and prosecute such proceedings. However, if at any time, 
having made reasonable investigation and inquiry of the Client's 
claims, the Attorneys determine that it is not feasible or proper 
for the Attorneys to prosecute such claims, the Attorneys shall 
notify the Client of the results of such investigation in a timely 
fashion and may withdraw from representing the Client pursuant to 
this Agreement, without further compensation to the Attorneys 
except for payment of reasonable Attorneys' fees for services 
performed, based on Attorneys' standard hourly rates, and out-of-
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pocket costs and disbursements previously paid or incurred. If 
this paragraph becomes applicable, then Client shall receive credit 
against his obligations to Attorneys for the $ 10,000.00 paid in 
connection with the execution of this agreement. 
10. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 9, the 
Attorneys may withdraw from representing the Client with respect to 
the subject matter of this Agreement, if in the opinion of the 
Attorneys, the matter should be settled or the Client is advised in 
writing that in the Attorneys' opinion further litigation would be 
detrimental to the Clients' best interest, and the Client nonethe-
less elects to disregard the Attorneys' opinion. Upon any such 
withdrawal of representation, the Attorneys shall be entitled to 
reasonable Attorneys' fees for services performed before the time 
of such withdrawal, provided however that such Attorneys' fee shall 
not exceed the fees that would have been due on the basis of any 
settlement recommended by the Attorneys. If this paragraph becomes 
applicable, then Client shall receive credit against his obliga-
tions to Attorneys for the $10,000.00 paid in connection with the 
execution of this agreement. 
11. The Client hereby assigns to the Attorneys, to the 
extent of Attorneys' fees and the Attorneys' out-of-pocket cost 
disbursements, any recovery in favor of the Client by way of 
settlement, suit, administrative proceedings or otherwise and the 
Client hereby agrees that the Attorneys may retain the Attorneys' 
share of such recovery. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-51-41, the 
Attorneys have and claim a lien, securing payment of the amounts 
due under this agreement, on Client's cause of action and claims. 
12. The Client acknowledges that the Attorneys have made 
no guaranty with respect to the success of any settlement 
negotiations, trial or appeal with respect to the Client's claims, 
and that all expressions by the Attorneys as to the outcome of such 
claims are opinions only. 
13. The Client agrees to fully cooperate with the 
Attorneys in the investigation, preparation and prosecution of the 
Client's claims, and further agrees to honor the judgment of the 
Attorneys respecting matters of law and strategy in the prosecution 
of such claims for so long as the Client elects to retain the 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this 
Attorneys Fee Agreement as of the date first above written. 
CLIENT: 
William Anthony iSraatz 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A P r o f e s s i o n a l Corporat ion 
\MNZ\D\334 
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2(a) 01/05/93 MNZ Review complaint redrafted by K. 
Linebaugh; conference with K. 
Linebaugh re theories of recovery 
and additional elements of 
damages. 
0.75 
4 02/18/94 JJD Review Heritage Imports v. 
Universal Underwriters Insurance 
case file at Third District Court; 








4 04/07/94 CT 
4 04/08/94 CT 
Review and analyze vendor fies for 3.00 
Bloomingtonf Fort-Dougfas/Hidden 
Valley and Willowcreek Country 
Clubs. 
Continue review and analysis of 1.00 
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03/18/96 MNZ Conference with Con Gray and 
Tony Kraatz re value and 








TP Draft letter to Tony re Volume III of 2.30 
his deposition; telephone 
conference with court reporter in 
Chicago to verify review of files to 
venfy our documents; conference 
with MNZ re deposition and prepare 
for Lariat-Ryan warranties; 
telephone conference with Jennifer 
Faik re Rick Warner checks. 
MNZ Conference with paralegal re 0.30 
deposition preparation. 
MNZ Prepare for and depose Ryan 1.50 
Insurance (Mr. Tim Dunn) re service 





09/26/97 J B G Complete initial draft of legal 
argument re misconstruction of 
terms refusal, indude, and herein, 
and legal argument ne applicability 
of handbook; office conference with 
M. Zundei re brief issues and re 
additional legal argument re thai 
courts use of ambiguous rectal to 
Engraft substantive provisions on 
operative portions of agreement 
8.60 1247.00 
(R. 4475). 
01/27/QQ JWM RESEARCH AVAILABILITY CF DAMAGES 
RECOVERY CF "FRINGE BENEFITS* 3J20 283.C0 (R. 4804). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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9 09/25/96 JJD Telephone conference with M. 
Zundefc review summary of cases 
decided by Judge Frederick to 
determine how Judge Frederick 
ruled and which decisions were 
affirmed and reversed by appellate 
courts. 
9 09/30/96 JJD Attorney conference re report on 
review of Judge Frederick's cases 
in which he was affirmed or 
reversed on appeal, and case 
strategy. 
9 10/02/96 MNZ Conference with J.J. Devashrayee 
re merits of appeal. 
9 10/02/96 JJD Attorney conference re review of 
transcript of Judge Frederick's 
ruling, and case strategy; determine 
number of decisions of Judge 
Frederick after bench trial which 
were uttimateiy affirmed or 
reversed; review cases decided by 
Judge Frederick involving bench 
trials which were either affirmed or 
reversed; conduct research re 
procedure for seeking 
disqualification of judge. 
Page 1 
10/03/96 MNZ Conference with J .J . Devashrayee 1.50 225.00 
re statistical analysts of appeals 
and decisions by Judge Frederick 
(.5); research issues re attorney's 
fees and risks for loss to Tony 
Kraatz (.5); prepare letter to Mark 
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10/03/S6 JJD Attorney conference re report on 
results of research re (1) cases 
cited by Judge Frederick affirmed or 
reversed on appeal dealing only 
with civil cases and excluding jury 
verdicts and motions, and (2) 
procedure for challenging 
qualifications of Judge Frederick to 
continue in case; review cases 
decided by Judge Frederick 
reversed by appellate courts to 
determine basis for which cases 
were reversed; report results of 
review to M. Zundel; further review 
cases decided by Judge Frederick 
which were reversed by appellate 
courts to determine if cases were 
reversed where evidence 
introduced at trial did not support 
findings; conduct research re right 
of victorious party on contract 
dispute to recover attorney's fees. 
8.90 979.00 
(R. 4459). 
10/07/96 JJD Continue to review cases decided 
by Judge Frederick which were 
reversed on appeal to determine 
basis for reversal. 
1.20 132.00 
(R. 4459). 
10/08/96 JJD Further review cases re right of 
victorious party in litigation to 
recover attorney's fees pursuant to 
contract review case law re 
reversal of tower court decision 
based on findings not conforming to 
evidence; complete preliminary 
review of afl cases decided by 
Judge Frederick which were 
reversed on appeai to determine 
whether reversal was based on 
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9 10/09/96 JJD Attorney conference re assignment 5.90 549.00 
to determine expert witness fees 
incurred or advanced on behalf of 
client in preparation for sending 
letter to M Schmitz; review prebilis 
and expert witness fee materials in 
case file to determine expert 
witness fees incurred or advanced 
on behalf of client and revise letter 
to M. Schmitz to reflect accurate 
numbers; attorney conference re 
report on results of research re 
reversals by appellate court of 
Judge Frederick's decisions and 
Mr. Kraatfs potential liability for 
attorney's fees if unsuccessful on 
appeal; telephone conference with 
M. Zundel and S. Stoker re 
experience with Judge Frederick on 
remand of case that had been 
reversed by appellate court; review 
notes, research and other materials 
in case file; draft outline of office 
memorandum to M. Zundel 
memorializing results of review and 
research; begin drafting 
memorandum. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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9 10/10/96 JJD Complete initial draft of 4.30 473.00 
memorandum to M. Zundei re 
statistics concerning Judge 
Fredenck's record on appeal, 
potential liability to T. Kraatz for 
attorney's fees if unsuccessful on 
appeal, and procedure for seeking 
disqualification of Judge Fredenck if 
case is remanded; shepardize 
cases cited in memorandum; review 
prebills and other materials in case 
file, prepare updated summary of 
costs incurred in case, expert 
witness fees advanced on behalf of 
T. Kraatz expert witness fees to be 
advanced on behalf of T. Kraatz, 
and amounts owing to firm by T. 
Kraatz; review additional case law 
re liability for attorney's fees to 
prevailing party on appeal. (R. 4461). 
10/29/96 JJD Telephone call from M. Zundei re 
Judge Frederick's record on appeal 
for last two years; conduct analysis 
of Judge Frederick's record on 
appeal for last two years and 
telephone call to M. Zundei re 
report on analysis; copy cases 
evidencing bench trials conducted 
by Judge Frederick subject to 
appeal; conduct research re 
standard of appellate review. 
9 10/29/96 JJD Telephone call from M. Zundei re 
Judge Frederick's record on appeal 
for last two years; conduct analysis 
of Judge Frederick's record on 
appeal for last two years and 
telephone call to M. Zundei re 
report on analysis; copy cases 
evidencing bench trials conducted 
by Judge Frederick subject to 
appeal; conduct research re 
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4 07/26/93 JJD Travel to Kinkos and compare 
copies of documents to originals to 
determine wnether documents were 
copied correctly; bring ail copies of 





JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda 5.00 
and meet with Helen Green and 
counsel for Heritage Honda to 
discuss production of documents 
requested. 
JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda 4.30 
and review accounts payable 
documents; telephone conference 
with T. Kraatz re arrangement for T. 





4 08/25/93 JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda 




4 08/27/93 JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda 
and review accounts payabte 




4 08/31/93 JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda 




4 09/21/93 JJD Travel to and review accounts 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
09/23/93 
09/24/93 
JJD Travel to and review documents 
and financial records at Heritage 
Honda. 
JJD Travel to and review financial 




360.00 (R. 4 3 6 7 ^ 
10/06/93 JJD Travel to Heritage Honda and 
review financial statements and 
other documents; meet with counsel 
for Heritage Honda and arrange for 
various documents to be copied. 
5.40 486.00 
(R. 4368). 
10/14/93 JJD Travel to and review general 
ledgers, schedules and other 




11/22/93 JJD Telephone conference with T. 
Kraatz re status of analysis of 
financial statements; travel to and 
review documents at Heritage 






JJD Telephone calls to and from counsel 5.00 
for Heritage Honda re arrangement 
of time to review copied documents 
and compare with originals; travel to 
and review copied documents at 
office of counsel for Heritage 
Honda 
JJD Conference with T Kraatz and M. 6.00 
Zundel re analysis of financial 
statements of Heritage Honda and 
discussion of case; travel to office of 
counsel for Heritage Honda and 
review copied documents in 





03/08/94 JJD Travel to and review documents at 
office of B. Wilkinsons accountant 
1.90 171.00 
(R. 4380). 
4^0 Page 26 
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03/21/94 JJD Travel to and review copies of 




03/22/95 C T Travel with MNZ to First Secunty 
Bank Operations Center to meet 
with Marie Chambers and to review 
documents assembled in response 
to our subpoena. 
1.20 72.00 
(R. 4404). 
03/23/95 MNZ Review documents produced by 
WestOne Bank; review documents 
produced by Key Bank. 
3.00 420.C 
(R. 4404). 
07/29/96 JJD Review research in case file and 
attorney conference re report on 
results of research; conduct 
additional research re (1) 
acquiescence, consent and 
condonation by employer of acts of 
employee, and (2) whether 
employer may rely on causes for 
discharge not originally relied on for 
discharge; travel to and from and 
review case file at Third District 
court obtain copy of latest 
scheduling order from Judge. 
7.70 847.00 
(R. 4433). 
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03/31/94 
03/31/94 
MNZ Prepare for and attend deposition of 5.00 
Matt Wilkinson 
C T Prepare documents for use at 4.00 
deposition of Matthew Wilkinson; 
continue to index boxes of Heritage 
Honda documents obtained from 
Suitter Axiand; conference with M. 
Zundel re preparation of exhibits for 
use at deposition of Bry Wilkinson; 
begin to assemble the documents. 
KBL Attendance at Matt Wilkinson 3.50 










Prepare for and attend third day of 
deposition of JJ Wilkinson; prepare 
for and attend first day of deposition 
of Bry Wilkinson. 





775.00 (R. 4384). 
04/20/94 MNZ Continue deposition of Bryan 7.30 
Wilkinson. 
04/20/94 KBL Attendance at Bry Wilkinson's 6.00 





05/11/94 MNZ Prepare for and conduct deposition 6.00 
of Bryan Wilkinson 
05/11/94 KBL Attendance at deposition of Bry 3.00 
Wilkinson 
840.00 
465.00 (R. 4385). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




MNZ Prepare for deposition of Helen 9.00 
Green (3.0); depose Helen Green 
(first day) (6.0). 
KBL Attendance at H. Green deposition; 1.50 
telephone conference with T. Kraatz 
re same portions of H. Green 
testimony. 
TP Prepare for and attendance at 8.50 
Helen Green deposition. Make 







TP Continue Helen Green deposition, 
assist MNZ. Make copies, review 
files, etc. Refile documents. 
Conference with MNZ. Organize 
boxes and indexes. 
MNZ Prepare for second day of 
deposition of Helen Green (1.5); 
depose Ms. Green (3.0). 
2.90 188.50 
4.50 675.00 split 
(R. 4419). 
02/06/96 MNZ Finalize preparation for Gorringe 
deposffion (1.0); depose Mr. 
Gorringe (5.5). 
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MNZ Prepare for and depose Larry Miller. 10.00 
TP Prepare copies for and attend Larry 9.00 
Miller deposition; draft cover letters 
to Tony Kraatz, Walter Hall and 
Mark Schmitz re shareholder 
agreement 
KBL File review and attendance at L 2.90 
Miller deposition. 
KBL Attorneys conference re materials 3.00 
for opposition to motion for 
summary judgment; attendance at 
deposition of L. Miller attorneys 
conference outlining damage 
possibilities and numbers. 
MNZ Prepare for and depose Larry Miller 7.00 
for second day (4.0); prepare for 








08/29/96 KBL Attendance at trial. 2.10 346.50 ( R .4452). 
08/30/96 KBL Listen to trial (2x). 1.60 264.00 ( R . 4452) 
12/12/96 JJD Continue to review trial transcripts 
and other materials in case file; 
continue to revise entire docketing 
statement 
12/12/96 J JD Continue to review findings of fact 
and conclusions of law entered by 
court attorney conference re 
proposed revisions and additions to 
docketing statement; review 




 ( R 4466). 
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03/08/94 KBL Attorneys conference re deposition 
and production of documents 
schedule and strategy. 
03/08/94 MNZ Conference with K. lineoaugh re 
depositions and prepare letter to 
Dennis Hasiam re nnancai 
statements and deposition 








MNZ Conference with K.3. Unebaugh re 
preparation of discovery order, 
conference call to Kent Schmidt re 
deposition schedule; call to Tony 
Kraatz re schedule of discovery and 
expert witnesses; prepare letter to 
Jennifer Falk re discovery schedule. 
KBL Attorneys conference re scheduling 
and strategy, including tetephone 




JJD Finalize preiiiranaiy revisions to 
prejudgment interest response and 
submit to M. Zundel for review; 
attorney conference re proposed 
revisions to brief, and further revise 
brief and submit to M. Zundei; 
further revise reply bnef in response 
to defendants' objection to 
attorney's fee affidavit review draft 
of proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in preparation for 
filing with court conduct additional 
research re prejudgment interest; 
travel to and from and file proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of 
law with court organize materials in 
case file. 
8.30 913.00 
MNZ Finalize findings and conclusions; 
call from Jennifer Falk re late filing; 
call from Tony Kraatz re 
modifications and corrections; 
conference wflh K.3. Linebaugh re 
findings and conclusions. 
7.90 1185.00 
(R. 4456). 
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4 02707/94 
4 02/07/94 
KBL Attorneys conference re discovery 
strategy and in- house settlement 
meeting. 
JJD Review latest revisions to 
responses to defendants requests 
for production of documents and 
interrogatories; conferences with C. 
Turner re review of documents to be 
produced to defendants, and 
revisions to responses to 
defendants interrogatories; 
conference with M. Zundel and C. 
Turner re same; telephone call from 
T. Kraatz re revisions to responses 
to interrogatories and arrangement 
of time to sign verification; 
conference with T. Kraatz re status 
of case and his revisions to 







4 02/15/94 MNZ Conference with K. Linebaugh and 
J. Devashrayee re status of case, 
discovery, settlement and legal 
theories. 
3.50 490.00 
4 02/15/94 JJD Conference with K, Linebaugh, M. 
Zundel and C. Turner re case 
strategy; conference with M. Zundel 
re documents which have not been 
produced by defendants; review 
notes of comparisons of documents 
which have been produced to 
document requests, and prepare list 






JJD Telephone calls to an from counsel 
for Heritage Honda re arrangement 
of time to review documents 
produced by T. Kraatz and 
arrangement of time to review 
documents at office of B. Wilkinsons 
accountant conference with C. 
Turner re confirmation of time for 
counsel for Heritage Honda to 
review documents; conference with 
K. Linebaugh and M. Zundel re 
settlement strategy arc ^ther 
matters. 
1.00 90.00 
4 02/23/94 KBL Attorneys conference re defendants 
insurance claims and our strategy; 
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3 06/02/93 
3 06/02/93 
MNZ Conference with K. Linebaugh; 0.90 
conference call with Tony Kraatt re 
settlement strategy and prepare 
letter to Bill Prater. 
KBL Attorneys conference and 0.40 
telephone conference with cfient re 





3 06/16/93 MNZ 
3 06/16/93 MNZ 
Continue conference with Kent 
Linebaugh re settlement strategy. 
Prepare fcr and attend meeting with 
Tony Kraatz, Wendy Kraatz and 
Kent Linebaugh re possible 
settlement; conference with K. 








WU' ~W "V '; 
KBL Attorneys conference with Kent 
Schmidt 
JJD Gather materials and prepare for 
conference with K. Schmidt; 
conference with K. Schmidt re 
valuation of dealership; telephone 
calls to T. Kraatz re arrangement of 






4 01/13/94 MNZ Conference with Kent Schmidt re 3.50 490.00 
valuation of dealership. " (R. 4373). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4 04/27/93 JJD Conference with M. Zundel re reply. 7.30 657 00 
to defendants memorandum in 
opposition to motion to compel 
discovery; conduct research re 
waiver of right to object to discovery 
requests if such objections are not 
timely filed; review pleadings and 
other matenals in case file; begin 
drafting reply memorandum in 
support of motion to compel 
discovery. 
4 04/27/93 MNZ Conference with J. Devashrayee re 0.80 112.00 
discovery requests and response to 
Wilkinsons discovery. 
4 04/28/93 JJD Conference with M. Zundel and K. 4.80 432.00 
Linebaugh re strategy for replying to 
defendants memorandum in 
opposition to motion to compel 
discovery; review pleadings, 
correspondence, and other 
matenals in case file; draft affidavit 
of William Anthony Kraatz and begin 
revising same; complete draft of 
and begin revising reply 
memorandum in support of motion 
to compel discovery. 
4 04/28/93 KBL Attorneys conference on discovery 0.60 
strategy; review of memo in support 







3 05/25/93 KBL 
3 05/25/93 MNZ 
Attorneys conference re results of 
Tonys meeting with Larry Miller. 
Cail to Tony re settlement 
discussions with Larry Miller 
conference with K. Linebaugh and 
report conversation with Tony. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
) 01/21/93 MNZ Conference with K. Linebaugh re 0.30 
Judge Fredericks appointment to 
preside over the case. 
) 01/21/93 KBL Attorneys conference re advisability 0.20 
of requesting jury triaL 
42.00 
31.00 (R. 4342) 
01/27/93 
01/27/93 
JJD Conference with M. Zundel re 1.20 
strategy for interviewing witnesses 
to case; review Universal Warranty 
Company documents and other 
materials in case file. 
MNZ Conference with J. Devashrayee re 0.50 
discovery strategy. 
108.00 




JJD Conference with M. ZundeJ re 
drafting of response to amended 
answers to interrogatories and 
requests for production of 
documents of Heritage. 
KBL Attorneys conference re our 
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KBL 
11/06/92 JJD 
Attorney conference and telephone 
conference with cSent re merits and 
scheduling attomey/dient 
conference. 
Conference with M. Zundel and K. 





11/18/92 KBL Review of materials to check list 1.00 
possible causes of action; attorneys 
- conference re same. 
11/18/92 JJD Conference with K. Linebaugh re 6.40 
causes of action against 
corporation and individuals; 
complete draft of demand letter, 




12/16/92 M N Z Conference with Lee McCullough, 
Tony, Wendy. K. Linebaugh, and J . 
Devashrayee re history of 




12/16/92 KBL Completed detailed review of C. 
McCuilock materials; office 
conference with client and L 
McCuilock re background facts and 





KBL Attorneys conference re form of 1 -30 
discovery requests; editing requests 
for production. 
MNZ Conference with K. Linebaugh re 0.50 
discovery requests. 
201.50 
70.00 (R- 4356). 
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11/18/96 JJD Continue researcn re definition of 
"refusal," and review cases found 
dunng researcn; attorney 
conference re report on results of 
researcn; attorney conference re 
assignment to review trial 
transcnpts and to begin marshaling 
faos in preparation for drafting 
appellate brief; review notes of K. 
Unebaugh and begin reviewing 
transcnpts. 
7.50 826.QQ 
9 11/18/96 MNZ Review K.3. Unebaugn's notes and 
transcripts of testimony in 
connection with the appeal; 




9 08/07/97 MNZ Conference with J.B. Gamer re 
interpretation of contract refusal 
provision and other provisions. 
2.00 340.00 
9 08/07/97 J B G Office conference with MNZ re 
interpretation of contract attacking 
findings on appeal, and preparation 
of legal argument re interpretation 
of contract; begin review of case 
documents including findings of 
fact conclusions of law, and 




9 12/11/97 MNZ 
9 12/11/97 J B G 
Continue revision of brief, call to 2.50 
Jennifer Faik; note issues in pretrial 
order, conference with J.B. Gamer. 
Office conference with M. Zundel re 6.20 
additional changes to brief, review 
pretrial order and trial brief; 
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03/27/98 MNZ Prepare for and attend conference 5.00 
Tr.. 2C with K.B. Linebaugh, J.B. Gamer 
and Sheleigh Chalkiey re 
preparation of rebuttal brief. 
03/27/98 KBL Attorneys conference re form and 0.70 
strategy of reply brief. 
850.00 
129.50
 ( R 448 0 ) 
05/11/98 JBG Office conference with KBL and 6.10 
MNZ re KBL comments and 
concerns regarding reply brief; 
begin revision of brief to incorporate 
KBL comments and revisions 
discussed in conference. 
05/11/98 KBL Brief review of materials in 2.30 
preparation for attorneys drafting 





02/19/99 JBG Office conference with MNZ re 0.30 
initial draft of response to letter of 
supplemental authorities. 
02/19/99 MNZ Review Winder's letter to the Court 0.50 
re supplemental authority; consider 
necessity of response and 
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